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ARTICLES
THE DEATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEMOCRACY
Joshua Ulan Galperin*
INTRODUCTION
Unelected bureaucrats are the very heart of administrative law's relentless
conflict over democratic legitimacy. Critics and supporters of the administrative state
are united in their certainty that the federal bureaucracy is unelected, and from that
agreement, they proceed to debate the best alternative source of legitimacy beyond
elections.
* This Article is part of a series of articles exploring the attempt at electoral democracy evident in the
USDA Farm Service Agency's elected county committees. The companion article is Joshua Ulan
Galperin, The Life ofAdministrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213 (2020). Forboth articles I owe thanks
to many. Alex Schluntz, Christine Kwon, Will Liang, and Heather Wong are former students at Yale
University who brought the elected committees to my attention. Susan Schneider taught me a heck of a
lot about agriculture law. Nate Rosenberg persuaded me that my initial positive reaction to the elected
committees might be naive. The many who workshopped this Article with me: Phil Hackney, Blake
Emerson; participants in the Academy of Food Law and Policy workshop at Harvard Law School,
especially Melissa Mortazavi and Peter Barton Hutt; participants at the AALS New Voices in
Administrative Law workshop, most importantly Jack Beerman, Kent Barnett, Bill Buzbee, Chip Murphy,
and David Rubenstein; participants in the AALS Food Law Section workshop, including Sarah Morath,
Robert Glicksman, Laurie Beyranevand, and Mathilde Cohen; participants in Mike Pappas' online
workshop, including Ed Richards, Justin Pidot, Katy Kuh, Brigham Daniels, Deepa Badrinarayana, Shi-
Ling Hsu, Dave Owen, and Sharmila Murthy; finally, Miriam Seifter and the participants in the
Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable, especially Michael Sant'Ambrogio, Kati Kovacs, Nick
Bagley, Kristin Hickman, Matt Lawrence, Chris Walker, and Nick Parillo, the last of whom said to me
early in my research that if there are indeed elected federal regulators it would force us to reconsider our
entire notion of administrative law. I haven't gone that far ... yet.
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Judge Wald, long one of the leading administrative law experts on the D.C.
Circuit, fretted over "unelected administrators." Justice White once warned of
"unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill the role." 2 Justice Scalia,
too, noted the ubiquity of "unelected federal bureaucrats."3 Chief Justice Roberts, for
a majority of the Supreme Court, lamented that "people do not vote for '[o]fficers of
the United States."'4 In late June 2019, Justice Gorsuch dissented for himself, the
Chief Justice, and Justice Thomas in Gundy v. United States, objecting broadly to
administrative policymaking on the grounds that administrators are not elected.5 In
June 2020 the Chief Justice again wrote for a majority of the Court in Seila Law v.
CFPB, describing the president's unique electoral role within the executive branch.6
Concurring, Justice Thomas repeated the Chief's words, restating that "people do not
vote for '[o]fficers of the United States."'7
Critics of the administrative state like Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo
argue that a strong presidency is the only way to assure answerable administrators.8
Calabresi points to the President's electoral accountability, in contrast to the
insulation of bureaucrats, as a reason to maximize presidential power.9 Then-
Professor Kagan's work on presidential power may have brought the chorus to a
crescendo: "unelected administrative officials"; "unelected administrators"; "agency
officials who are not elected." 10
Administrative defenders, such as Jerry Mashaw, Cass Sunstein, and Lisa
Bressman, do not defer to the President so readily, but they do recognize the truth of
the underlying critique that administrators are not elected. Bressman complains of
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
3 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305 (2013).
" Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497-98 (2010) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
5 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
6 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020).
LId. at 2212 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497-98).
8 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3 (2008).
9 Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 43-45
(1994).
10 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2262-63, 2331 (2001).
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too much attention on majoritarianism in administrative law, though she takes the
lack of direct majoritarian accountability for granted." Mashaw accepts the premise
that bureaucrats are unelected but locates accountability in other features of the
administrative state." Sunstein puts the core of the agreement simply: "[t]he modern
administrative agency has attenuated the links between citizens and governmental
processes."13
Because everybody agrees that administrators are unelected and because of that
lack of direct accountability, Richard Stewart briefly considered the prospect of
electing administrators but dismissed the idea." His other vital insights have since
swamped his unusual electoral proposition."
Everybody agrees. Everybody is certain. There are not, nor have there ever
been, elected bureaucrats.
That pervasive certainty must come as quite a surprise to elected bureaucrats.
Federal bureaucracy presents a handful of examples of administrative elections,
but the most significant is the United States Department of Agriculture's Farm
Service Agency county committees. Across the country, there are over 7,500 elected
farmers sitting on over 2,000 committees, and these committees carry out
paradigmatic administrative duties, including policymaking and adjudication.16
Other examples of electoral administration exist,17 but the farmer committee system
disproves what we have always known. There are elected bureaucrats.
If the elected committees of the United States Department of Agriculture seem
too esoteric to be meaningful, consider the renowned case Wickard v. Filburn.18
" Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462-63, 478 (2003).
12 JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 5 (2018).
13 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 505 (1987).




16 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, 2018 FARM SERVICE AGENCY COUNTY COMMITTEE
ELECTIONS 2 (2018), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/NewsRoom/
County-Committee-Elections/pdf/2018_fsa_countycommittee_electionsbriefing.pdf.
17 See infra Section I.A.
"8 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Constitutionally, as all first-year law students know, Wickard is about the
applicability of the Commerce Clause to purely intrastate activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.19 Practically, Wickard is the endpoint of a
conflict that started at an elected farmer committee. A committee of elected farmers,
implementing federal agriculture law at the county level, initially told Filburn how
much wheat he could produce.20 That same committee discovered that Filburn was
producing in excess of his wheat allotment, and that committee levied the fine that
Filburn challenged all the way to the United States Supreme Court.21 In other words,
elected administrators are real, they impact real lives, and they have already played
an important role in constitutional history.
The goal of this Article is to understand what electoral administration might
teach us about more common approaches to administrative governance.
Since everybody agrees that there are no elected administrators, the eternal
struggle in administrative law has been to find the source of administrative
legitimacy absent a direct connection with voters.22 A leading proposition, which, to
a significant degree, the Supreme Court has favored, is that the President is the fount
of democratic legitimacy, the connection between voters and the bureaucracy. As a
result, there is a doctrine of Presidentialism that prioritizes presidential control of
agencies.23
When we introduce electoral administration into this system, something strange
happens. The doctrine that prioritizes presidential control because the President has
a majoritarian connection will reject administrators who have an electoral
19 Id. at 124.
20 Id. at 114.
21 Id. at 113-15.
22 Nick Bagley persuasively argues that legitimacy debates are overblown in administrative law and tend
to focus onproceduralism (whether procedures that advance a connectionwiththe President or procedures
that seek to assure some fidelity to facts, as just two examples) as the proper legitimizer. Nicholas Bagley,
The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2019). I am inclined to agree with his conclusion that
at base the fights are not about he practice of administration, but the "distrust of state power, full stop."
Id. at 387. Nevertheless, as his work demonstrates, it is not enough to declare that special attention to
legitimacy is unnecessary, we need to justify that claim, which is larger the goal of this Article.
23 See infra Section III.A.
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responsibility more direct than one that funnels through the President." The Court's
precedent on appointment and removal of federal officers, even though it champions
electoral responsiveness, cannot bear bureaucracy tied directly to an electorate but
untethered from the President. Current doctrine demands a level of presidential
control over administrative officials that cannot coexist with elected administrators
who must, to one degree or another, respond to their voters rather than the President.
Presidentialist claims of democratic legitimacy turn out to reject "too much
democracy" though what is really at stake is not democracy, but mere
majoritarianism. Given the functional and constitutional failures of the elected
farmer committees and the text and structure of the Constitution, this Presidentialist
rejection is the right result.25 Yet, while Presidentialism may get it right in this
situation, it is a meager victory. Presidentialist doctrine rejects electoral
administration because electoral administration relies too much on majoritarianism.
But Presidentialism embraces the same majoritarianism, the same one-dimensional
oversimplification of democracy. Applying majoritarian Presidentialist doctrine to
majoritarian electoral administration lays bare an error of Presidentialist theory. Both
electoral administration and Presidentialism go a step too far. They seek to tidy up
the constitutional structure of democracy rather than embrace intentional
constitutional complexity.
Instead of a superficial majority-rule notion of democracy, a comparison
between elected administration, Presidentialist administration, and what we might
call "constitutional administration" helps clarify the ways the Constitution integrates
diverse structures of participation to combine the intersubjective and reflexive will
of the people with visions of individualism, rationality, and consideration.
Majoritarianism alone presumes that public values and goals are pre-political and
pre-legal, existing apart from the various processes of debating, making, and
enforcing the law. If we can accept that these legal processes do not just filter public
values, but also shape values, then we should also accept that the fundamental
processes of administrative democracy should recognize this value-shaping function
of law. Constitutional design certainly recognizes this function.
Evident in the Constitution are processes for deliberation, reason-giving, and
demands for individual participation in governance along with, of course, the vote.26
24 See infra Section III.B.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See infra Part V.
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The already famous "census case," Department of Commerce v. New York, hints at
this more complex view of administration. Chief Justice Roberts, for the majority,
explained that agencies certainly might, for purely ideological and political reasons,
prefer certain courses of action, but they must explain that preference honestly.27 "It
is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences
and ideas ... ,"28 but "[t]he reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law,
after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important
decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public."29
Agencies, according to the Court, have a responsibility to engage with the public and
judiciary honestly. The rule of law and heart of democracy require individual
participation, deliberation, and reason-giving, none of which can be fully washed out
by majoritarian insistences.
A consideration of elected administrators clarifies that this more complex view
of democracy may be a better source of legitimacy than the majoritarianism that
animates electoral administration and Presidentialism. Administrative governance
need not rely on contrived sources of legitimacy because administration is not a
different kind of governance than the rest of our constitutional system.
The next section introduces electoral administration by uncovering its few
instances at the federal level. It concludes that, in most cases, the hints of electoral
administration fall shy of either "electoral," "administration," or both. However, Part
I reintroduces the USDA's elected farmer committees, which are both genuinely
elected and bona fide administrators. Part II parses the legal constitution of the
farmer committees, confirming that in the strictest sense, they are "appointed"
through a popular election and are removable only by voters. Based on that structure,
Part III examines the constitutional challenge that Presidentialism poses to the farmer
committees. Part IV exposes the unlikely lesson of the Presidentialist challenge as a
challenge of "too much democracy." Part V contends that there is a constitutionally
"just right" democracy, and constitutional administration, unlike Presidentialism or
electoral administration, best embodies that notion of democracy. This Article
concludes by emphasizing that whether it is direct electoral administration or
Presidentialism rooted in majoritarianism, simplistic implementation of complex
democracy does more harm than good by evading difficult questions and creating a
2' Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
28 Id. at 2574.
29 Id. at 2575-76 (emphasis added).
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sense of certainty where a sense of collective and continuing reckoning should
prevail.
I. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
Professor Stewart's classic article, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, is remembered for many brilliant contributions.30 A proposition
for which it is rarely, if ever, cited is Professor Stewart's treatment of electoral
administration. Deep in his analysis, Stewart remarks that popularly electing
administrators might help legitimize a bureaucracy that makes myriad policy
decisions.31 That seemed to be the end of the matter. For all the attention Reformation
receives, the suggestion of electoral administration has gone unnoticed. Stewart
himself seems not to have noticed that as he was writing, there was an ongoing,
nearly 50-year-old experiment in electoral dministration within the United States
Department of Agriculture.3 2
Electoral administration is not widespread, but contrary to popular opinion, it
does exist, albeit in largely esoteric fields and, except for USDA farmer committees,
without meaningful authority.33 This section attempts to locate several examples of
electoral administration within the larger administrative state. Therefore, it is
important to have a working definition of the keywords "administrators" and
"elected." Although the meanings will become clearer as this section progresses and
concrete examples enter the picture, the basic ideas are as follows. Administrators
are the individuals who carry out the day-to-day work of the executive branch of the
federal government and, for the purposes of this Article, are particularly those
individuals who participate in authoritative decisions that can change legal rights and
obligations of private persons.34  I use "bureaucrat" and "administrator"
30 Stewart, supra note 14.
31 Id. at 1800-02. Although it is not explicit in his discussion, it is likely that Stewart was thinking not of
local elections, but of national elections, which, as will become clear, are distinct from the locally-bound
nature of the elected farmer committees, though local and national elections for federal officials naturally
have much in common
32 CHARLES M. HARDIN, THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE 116 (1952).
3 The examples in this section are gathered from a survey of the United States Code and the Code of
Federal Regulations based on a search of the root "elect!". After the search results were returned, I
removed any references to congressional orPresidential elections, or other electoral regulations. I likewise
removed references to the oversight of private elections by federal regulators such as oversight of and
requirements for labor union elections under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 481 (2018).
3 E.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 187 (1975).
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synonymously. "Elected" means placed into a position by a vote. Again, in this
section, I develop both ideas further through the survey of various entities that are
contestants for the title of electoral administration.
After reviewing several candidates, this section concludes that the examples
either do not fit the definition of administration, or they are not, in fact, elected. That
conclusion sets the stage for a closer look at the USDA farmer committee system as
the only example that can validly claim the mantle of "electoral administration."
A. Surveying Electoral Bureaucracy
The focus of this Article is the farmer committee system, in which local farmers
elect their peers to administrative committees with quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial authorities parallel to those of more typical federal agencies.35 These farmer
committees stand out for several reasons, not least of which is their scale and
authority. Though they are the only example of elected administrators who both
actually administer federal law and are actually elected, the farmer committees are
not the only example of elections within the federal bureaucracy.
The Federal Home Loan Bank system holds elections for directorships of each
bank.36 The Department of Housing and Urban Development supports elected
"resident councils" in public housing projects in order to increase the engagement of
residents in local decisionmaking.37 Within the Department of Labor, state labor
statistics directors elect, from their own ranks, a committee to work within the
Department and help the Department plan for its regular employment statistics
assessment.38 Grazing advisory boards are elected bodies that represent ranchers and
are elected from the ranks of other ranchers operating on federal lands.39 Also
attached to USDA, a variety of commodity management committees are elected to
control the production and marketing of specific agricultural products.
The Federal Home Loan Banks (FHL Banks) are government-affiliated and
hold elections for directors, but they are arguably not a government entity at all and
are certainly not regulatory or adjudicatory administrative units. FHL Banks are a
3 See infra Section I.B.
36 12 C.F.R. § 1261.2(c) (2020).
3 24 C.F.R. § 964 (2020).
38 29 C.F.R. 44.1 (2019). But see Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128, 128
Stat. 1425 (2014).
39 36 C.F.R. § 222.11 (2019).
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system of federally-chartered but privately-owned cooperative wholesale banks.4
Within each of the 11 FHL Bank regions is a single bank cooperatively owned by
private banks.1 The mission of the system is to help private lending banks make
funds available to the public, particularly for housing finance.42 A board of directors
governs each regional FHL Bank.4 3 Member Directors, elected from among the
member banks, and Independent Directors, likewise elected but not affiliated with
any member institutions, make up each FHL Bank board.4 4
These federally-chartered banks are born from federal initiative and closely
monitored by the Federal Housing Finance Agency,45 but they are probably best
categorized as private rather than public entities. Professor O'Connell describes
entities like the FHL Banks as government-supported entities or "quasi-government
organizations."46 But the banks themselves do not carry out regulatory or
adjudicatory duties akin to those of traditional administration. Their work is
commercial, not governmental, and the details of their electoral structure and
governance are not promulgated by the elected directors or staff of each bank, but by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency.4 7 The banks are not included in the United
States Government Manual, which catalogs agencies and activities of the entire
government, including "quasi-official agencies."48 And in at least one instance, a
federal court held that Federal Home Loan Banks are not federal agencies.49
40 Cooperative Structure, FHLBANKS, https://fhlbanks.com/cooperative-structure/ (last visited Aug. 29,
2020).
41 Id.
42 E.g., FHLBank's Mission, FHLBANKS, http://www.fhlbanks.com/mission/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
4 12 C.F.R. § 1261.2(a) (2020); see also Corporate Governance, FED. HOME LOAN BANK: N.Y.,
https://www.fhlbny.com/about-us/about-corporate-governance/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
" 12 C.F.R. § 1261.3(c) (2020); id. § 1261.2(a); Governance and Regulation, FHLBANKS, https://
fhlbanks.com/governance-and-regulation/ (last vi ited Aug. 29, 2020).
4 Federal Home Loan Bank System, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/
SupervisionRegulation/FederalHomeLoanBanks (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
46 Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 857 (2014).
4 12 C.F.R. pt. 1261 (2020).
48 The United States Government Manual, U.S. GOV'T MANUAL, https://www.usgovemmentmanual.gov/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
49 Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1289 (W.D. Wash.
2010).
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The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) supports the
establishment of elected "resident councils" in order to "recognize the importance of
resident involvement in creating a positive living environment and in actively
participating in the overall mission of public housing."50 Resident councils,
sometimes alternatively called tenant councils, may exist at two levels. A resident
council will represent each HUD-supported housing development, and these local
councils may join together to form a jurisdiction-wide resident council.51 In order to
receive certain federal support, residents must "have a democratically elected
governing board .... "52 The councils must adopt bylaws or a constitution, which
must lay out the electoral process, but by regulation, elections must be held at least
every three years, must include recall provisions, and must be open to all heads of
household or persons over 18 who are named on a lease within the development.5 3
A resident council may also choose to incorporate as a non-profit corporation in the
state in which it is located," which presumably allows the council to undertake a
wider array of activities, including acceptance of tax-deductible gifts and other
corporate undertakings. When incorporated, the body is called a resident
management corporation.55 These corporations can consist of a single resident
council or a group of resident councils, and in the latter case, the corporate board
must be elected and represent residents from each local council area.56
Once elected, these councils and corporations may "be involved and participate
in the overall policy development and direction of Public Housing operations."57 But
the real administration of public housing developments lies not with these elected
residents but with the local or state Housing Authority, which "has responsibility for
5024 C.F.R. § 964.1 (2020); id. § 964.115(b).
51 Id. § 964.105(a). For simplicity, I am using the term "development" to encompass a larger swath of
arrangements that a resident council may represent. According to HUD regulations, a resident council
may represent "residents residing: (1) In scattered site buildings; (2) In areas of contiguous row houses;
or (3) In one or more contiguous buildings; (4) In a development; or (5) In a combination of these
buildings or developments." Id. § 964.115(a).
52 Id. § 964.115(c).
5 Id. § 964.115 (b)-(c).
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management operations .... "58 The Housing Authority must, however, "ensure
strong resident participation"59 "in manners such as modernization, security,
maintenance, resident screening and selection, and recreation."60 Should a council
chose to incorporate, the corporation may formally contract with the Housing
Authority to carry out certain management functions at the discretion of the Housing
Authority.6 1 Because the councils are a voluntary opportunity for residents and any
given development has a governing structure prior to and independent of the councils
or corporations, these corporations seem to play a primarily advisory role.
These are federally-authorized entities, but the resident committees are
primarily providing advice and information to local, state, and federal officials rather
than implementing federal law. As HUD describes it, the core role of a resident
council is to "bring a wide variety of issues to the attention of the [Public Housing
Authority] from safety . .. to pet and eviction policy."6 2 The resident councils' main
interactions, despite being federally enabled, are with state- or local-level housing
authorities.63 These authorities administer federal law.64 The resident council advises
on that implementation.
The Department of Labor maintained an electoral system for well over a decade
before Congress replaced it with a more traditional appointment system in 2014. The
Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, as amended by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998,
required that the Department of Labor create a system to develop, maintain, and
improve nationwide employment statistics.65 Congress directed the Department to
coordinate with states to develop an annual plan for collecting nationwide statistics.66
58 See id. § 964.135(c).
59 Id.
60 See id. § 964.135(b).
61 See id. § 964.135(a).
62 Resident Councils: A Voice for Public Housing Tenants, RESIDENT NEWSLETTER (HUD, Wash., D.C.)
Dec. 2011, at 2, https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/RESIDENTDEC201 L.PDF.
63 See 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2020) (defining Public Housing Agency, with which resident councils are
designed to interface, as "any State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity or public body, or
agency or instrumentality of these entities, that is authorized to engage or assist in the development or
operation of low-income housing under the 1937 Act.").
64 Id.
65 Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 309, 112 Stat. 936, 1082.
66 Id. § 309(d)(2).
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The core of that coordination was a consultative body, the Workforce Information
Council, made up of state employment statistics directors who were elected by state
employment statistics directors in each of the Department of Labor's ten regions.67
In 2014 the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act68 amended the Workforce
Investment Act by, among other things, turning the annual planning process into a
two-year process and replacing the electoral system with an appointed advisory
council.69 Prior to this congressional change, Labor used the electoral system to
gather advice for data collection and statistics from state programs. When Congress
amended the law in 2014, it replaced the electoral system with an appointed body
because the new body was meant to cover a wider range of expertise that would be
unwieldy to manage electorally.70 Despite the statutory change, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) has informally maintained the elected councils under the new
moniker BLOC, "BLS Labor Market Oversight Council." 1 BLS maintains the
system because the Workforce Information Councils proved a critical source of
advice from state-level experts. The electoral system, in particular, was a good way
to gather high-quality input from individuals who were proactive about the federal-
state partnership.72
The Workforce Advisory Councils (and now BLOCs) have parallels to the
HUD resident councils. They are advice-giving bodies, designed to gather
knowledge from state-level experts in order to improve federal data collection.73
They are not administrative; they do not regulate, enforce, or resolve conflicts. They
do not change legal rights or obligations in any way. They are not elected from
populations at large, but from specific and narrow populations that are uniquely
67 Id. § 309(c).
68 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128, 128 Stat. 1425 (2014).
69 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 113-128, § 308(d)-(e), 128 Stat. 1425, 1628-1629
(2014). Interestingly, despite this clear statutory change in 2014, setting up an appointment system to
replace the electoral system, Labor regulations have not changed since the electoral system was
promulgated in 2000.
70 Telephone Interview with Rebecca Rust, Assistant Comm'r for Occupational Statistics and Emp't
Projections, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Mar. 11, 2019).
71 Id.
72 Id.
7 29 C.F.R. § 44.1 (2019).
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situated to have information on the substantive issue, in this case, employment
statistics," which reinforces their advisory role.
The New Deal was an apt time for the emergence of electoral administration
because the expanding role of the federal government butted against activities like
farming and ranching that were-at least in the minds of farmers, ranchers, and
politicians-the epitome of local individualism. Recognizing this localism, elections
were a promise that Washington would merely build a framework for progress but
would leave the real decisions in local, even private, hands. In ranching, electoral
administration began with the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Section 9 of which
directed the Secretary of the Interior to manage newly regulated grazing lands
cooperatively with ranchers.75 In 1950 Congress explicitly mandated the creation of
elected boards,76 and in 1976 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) restructured what was then called "local advisory boards" into the modern
"grazing advisory boards."7 7
Elections populate these boards and materialize them in the first place. Grazing
Advisory Boards are not mandatory, but if a majority of permittees in a particular
grazing region vote to establish such a board, then the Secretary of Agriculture is
bound to constitute a board.78 FLPMA establishes the outlines of the grazing board
electoral system. The Act directs that the boards must have between three and 12
members and must meet at least once annually.79 USDA regulations provide the
remaining details. Only National Forest System permittees are eligible for the
board.80 Election slates are established by nominations from eligible permittees, and
the elections are then conducted by secret ballot.81
Despite the formal electoral provisions, the actual role of the grazing advisory
boards is circumscribed. The statute clearly articulates that the purpose of the boards
7 Id.
7 Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. § 315h (2018).
76 An Act to Facilitate and Simplify the Work of the Forest Service and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No.
81-478, 64 Stat. 82, 87 (1950).
77 National Resource Lands Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).
78 16 U.S.C. § 580k (2018).
79 Id. § 580k(a)(3)-(4).
8 36 C.F.R. § 222.11(b) (2019).
81 Id. § 222.11(c).
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is to give "advice and recommendations" to the Forest Service.82 At the same time,
the regulations reiterate that the "[fjunction of the grazing advisory boards will be to
offer advice and make recommendations concerning the development of allotment
management plans and utilization of range betterment funds."8 3 Thus, like the HUD
advisory councils or the Labor employment statistics organizations, these elected
bodies serve as advisory panels and liaisons, as points of connection within the
administration, but not as bona fide administrators with outward-facing authorities.
The final example in this survey of potential electoral administration is
agricultural commodity committees. (To be clear, these commodity committees are
not the same as the county committees that I will detail soon and that will make up
the core of this study. The name and jurisdiction make the distinct agencies easy to
confuse.) Unlike the grazing boards and most of the other examples, commodity
committees are not mere advisors. These committees organize to self-regulate under
the auspices of the USDA. Congress allows the agriculture industry to establish
cartels that set a wide array of standards for certain agricultural products.84 Standards
cover a range of issues, including packaging, marketing limits, and the quality or
appearance of a product.85 A marketing agreement is an agreement among handlers
of a specific commodity, approved by the Secretary of the USDA, that sets rules only
for those who participate in the agreement; in contrast, a marketing order establishes
mandates even for producers and handlers who do not voluntarily engage in the
cartel.86 In the case of marketing orders, industry or the USDA may initiate
establishment, but the final decision rests with industry, which typically must
approve the marketing order by referendum.87
Once the industry and the USDA establish an order, the USDA sets up an
agency, often called a commodity committee, to administer the program.88 Each
committee thus has a different structure. By way of example, two committees
regulate oranges and grapefruits. One committee regulates oranges and grapefruits
82 16 U.S.C. § 580k(b) (2018).
83 36 C.F.R. § 222.11(e) (2019).
84 7 U.S.C. § 608b (2018); Marketing Orders & Agreements, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING
SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
85 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6) (2018); Marketing Orders & Agreements, supra note 84.
86 Marketing Orders & Agreements, supra note 84.
87 7 U.S.C. § 608c(19) (2018).
88 Id. § 608c(7)(C).
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gown in the lower Rio Grande Valley in Texas.89 Another committee regulates
oranges and grapefruits, tangerines, and pummelos grown in Florida.90 Both
committees are empowered to hold elections from which they select nominees for
membership on the committee.91 The Texas committee holds meetings at which the
vote takes place, and all votes must happen in person.92 The Florida committee
likewise holds election meetings but, in contrast to Texas, allows electronic or mail-
in votes in addition to in-person votes.93
In both cases, and in the case of all commodity committee elections, the
electoral process is important and is the defacto means of selecting members, but is
not the legal process of appointing members. Technically, these elections merely
identify potential nominees, and the Secretary of Agriculture formalizes the legal
appointment.94 It appears that the Secretary has always honored the election
process.95
These committees stand out from other examples because they directly
implement federal programs. The committees make decisions regarding quantity,
quality, and packaging of agricultural products, which can involve limiting the
amount of product a farmer grows or even acquiring excess product to assure that it
does not reach the market.96 In that respect, the committees are distinctly
administrative and not advisory. On the other hand, the commodity committees are
an oddity even among this survey of oddities because their elections are merely
89 7 C.F.R. pt. 906 (2020).
90 Id. at 905.
91 Id. § 905.22; id. § 906.23.
92 Id. § 906.23.
93 Id. § 905.22(c).
94 See, e.g., id. § 905.23(a) (establishing that the Secretary of USDA "shall" select members from the list
of elected nominees "or from other qualified persons."). See also id. § 906.23 ("The Secretary may select
members of the committee and alternates from nominations which may be made in the following
manner....").
95 Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing Orders Regulating Fruit
and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC.
L. REV. 3, 17 (1995).
96 See, e.g., Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 355 (2015).
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preliminary to a secretarial appointment, a much more common form of staffing the
federal bureaucracy.97
Other than the commodity committees, none of the examples in this section-
examples that may well be a complete census of elections in the federal
bureaucracy-are quite what we mean when we say "administrative agency." In
most cases, the elected bodies, like the employment statistics experts, the HUD
resident councils, or the FLPMA grazing advisory boards, are merely providing
advice rather than administering federal programs. The commodity committees come
close to, perhaps achieve, the title of real administration, but their electoral
credentials are practical, not legal, insofar as they formally rely on secretarial
appointment.
All of this is to say that there are examples of something that approaches
electoral administration, but all of these case studies look like exceptions that tend
to prove the rule against electoral administration. The USDA farmer committees
discussed in the next part are different. The farmer committees have a range of
authority to set policy, to adjudicate individual facts, to enforce policy, and to
otherwise implement federal law.
B. USDA's Elected Farmer Committees
As with so much of the modern administrative state, the USDA's elected farmer
committees began during the New Deal. The slow collapse of the agricultural
economy was one of the priorities of Roosevelt's New Deal and transformed the
USDA from a research and education outfit into a regulatory agency.98 The basic
structure of the New Deal agriculture program was to reduce the output of certain
crops in order to limit supply and raise prices.99 Rather than mandating that farmers
limit production, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 established a payment
system in which USDA would pay farmers to reduce their output voluntarily.10 0 In
an agency built around education rather than regulation, "a vast amount of help was
needed to sign up millions of farmers [for the payment and reduction program],
97 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 114TH CONG., REP. ON
POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 2016) (identifying roughly 9,000 appointed positions
within the federal government. But note that the Plum Book does not list marketing order committee
members among the 9,000 appointed positions).
98 MURRAY R. BENEDICT, FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1950 283 (1953).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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inspect their fields, and certify them for payments."01 The elected committees were
ultimately the help that USDA needed.
Candidate Roosevelt had assured farmers that he would take drastic action to
save agriculture and also that the action would be decentralized, local, and rooted in
"agricultural democracy."10 2 The Agricultural Adjustment Act authorized the
Secretary to "establish, for the more effective administration of the functions vested
in him by this title, State and local committees...."103 Although these committees
were appointed in most of the Southeast, in the Midwest they were elected from the
very beginning.10 4 By 1936, the electoral committee structure was a widespread
custom, and although the text is ambiguous, the Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act of 1936 was understood to require elected rather than appointed
farmer committees.105 The ambiguity of the 1936 law apparently did nothing to slow
the adoption of electoral selection, but it was not until 2002 that the electoral program
was fully defined. The 1994 and 2002 Farm Bills created an explicit electoral
structure, established eligibility requirements for voting and serving, term limits, and
nondiscrimination safeguards, among other features, and directed the Secretary of
USDA to promulgate further election standards.106 The details of this electoral
system are essential for understanding the very nature of electoral democracy and
are therefore described in much greater detail in the next section.
Once elected, the responsibilities of these committees were, and to a lesser
extent still are today, broad and varied. In the early days of implementing supply
control measures, the elected committees were essential at each step. The committees
established "base acres" for each farm, meaning committees determined how much
101 HARDIN, supra note 32, at 115.
102 Dale Clark, The Farmer as Co-Administrator, 3 PUB. OPINION Q. 482, 483 (1939) ("Governor
Roosevelt in his Topeka campaign address, in which he outlined farm policy, spoke for decentralized
administration."); Reed L. Frischknecht, The Democratization ofAdministration: The Farmer Committee
System, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 704, 705 (1953).
103 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 31, 37. Again, though similar
in some respects, these committees, which I will variously call county committees or elected farmer
committees, or occasionally elected county committees, are distinct from the commodity committees
described above.
104 HARDIN, supra note 32, at 115-16.
105 Id. at 116; Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-461, § 8(b), 49 Stat.
1148, 1150.
106 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii) (2018); Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-171, § 10708, 116 Stat. 134, 522-25.
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farmers historically produced so the committees could calculate how much the
farmers were reducing production under the new payment program.107 The
committees then determined allotments for each farm-how much each participating
farm in a county was permitted to produce.108 They would inspect farms to confirm
farmers were complying with their allotments.109 They would hand out the cash
payments owed as compensation for the output reductions." 0 And when disputes
arose over the size of payments or the allocation of allotments across the county, as
just two examples, the elected committees would resolve those disputes.11 "
Although it is remembered for its expansive reading of the Commerce Clause,
the decision in Wickard v. Filburn is a helpful example of the important role the
elected committees played at mid-Century.1 1 2 Farmer Filburn was challenging the
validity of the USDA's production limits on Commerce Clause grounds after the
USDA issued a fine for overproduction of wheat.113 It was the elected farmer
committee from Montgomery County, Ohio that issued Filburn his wheat allotment,
discovered his overproduction, and levied the fine." 4
Wickard is evidence of one sort of controversy, a legal controversy, but a social
controversy was also part of the committee's role. Although of somewhat less
importance in the Midwest where most farms were family farms (although wealth
disparities were indeed reflected in the committees), in the Southeast, the even more
hierarchical farming system forced elected committees to devise ways to divide, or
not, program payments between landowners and tenant farmers."5 The racial and
economic implications of this role were vast, and leaving the crucial decisions to






12 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1942).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FARM PROGRAMS: AN APPRAISAL OF
SERVICES RENDERED BY AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 90 (1965).
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committees rather than making them in Congress helped to avoid political fights over
race and wealth disparities at the national level.
Over the last 80 years, the structure of the farm programs has changed, altering
the specific duties of the elected committees but not the general scope of their
responsibilities.116 Today, the farm programs are no longer based on production
controls requiring committees to make allotment decisions. The programs are now
based on direct payments tied to market conditions." The market-oriented farm
programs somewhat limit committee discretion by linking decisionmaking to more
quantitative signals, but committees still play an important role. 118 And in many
areas, broad discretionary powers still rest with the elected committees. One of the
key roles of the committees is to hire and fire county executive directors,119 who are
themselves responsible for carrying out all the day-to-day tasks of local farm
program administration, from hiring and firing other local staff to accounting for all
committee property and finances.120 Committees are empowered to relieve farmers
of certain conservation restrictions if the committee determines that compliance with
the restrictions would lead to economic hardship.2 Committees determine
eligibility for various federal payment programs. 2 They decide whether one farmer
can transfer federal payments to a successor farmer.123 The elected committees also
make important county-wide legislative-type policies, such as setting the dates by
which farmers must plant specific crops in order to be eligible for disaster
payments." 4 The important discretionary policy of this "final planting date"
116 For a more thorough look at the committees' history and current responsibilities, see generally Life of
Administrative Democracy, supra note *.
"n MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONSERVATION COMPLIANCE AND U.S. FARM POLICY 3
(2016).
118 Id. at 62, 70-71.
119 7 C.F.R. § 1230.607 (2020).
12" CAROL CANADA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FARM SERVICE AGENCY: STATE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS,
AND STATE AND COUNTY/AREA COMMITTEES 5 (2009), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/assets/crs/R40179.pdf.
121 SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABILITY: READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL LAW
180 (2d ed. 2016).
122 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FORM CCC-471 NAP BP, NONINSURED CROP DISASTER ASSISTANCE
APPLICATION 5 (2015).
123 Id. at 17.
124 Id. at 3.
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authority is likely to grow in importance in an ever more volatile climate. As weather
patterns become less predictable and crop failures more common, the survival of
farms and huge amounts of federal money will hinge on each elected committee's
decisions about threshold planting dates.
If the statutory authorization and the past and present functions of the elected
committees are not enough to demonstrate their genuine administrative functions-
that their decisions can result in real legal consequences for members of the public-
one need only consider that committee decisions have been the source of plenty of
litigation. Beyond Wickard, the modern committees have also been the subject of
suits. In only very recent years, there have been suits challenging the committee
decisions on disaster assistance,125 conservation payments,126 and loan repayment."'
Unlike the other examples of electoral administration described in this section,
the USDA farmer committees are both elected, and they serve traditional
adjudicative and policymaking functions.
Although it is not the crux of this Article, and I discuss it in much greater detail
in another paper,128 the ideological drivers of elected committees and the committee
failures both shine a light on the deeper lessons of electoral administration discussed
later in this Article. A brief summary is therefore helpful.
There is no one definitive reason that Congress and the USDA decided on an
electoral system for agricultural governance, but several ideological positions fit
together to explain the unique program. The most popular explanation for local
electoral control is Jeffersonianism, the assertion that the rugged self-sufficiency of
farmers was both an ideal individual quality and a prerequisite for leadership.129
Jeffersonianism, therefore, argues that farmers should govern the nation.13 It follows
that those who believed farmers must run the nation also believed farmers should
govern themselves. A system in which farmers elect other farmers to implement the
125 Hixson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 15-cv-02061-RBJ, 2017 WL 2544637 (D. Colo. June 13, 2017).
126 Mittelstadtv. Perdue, 913 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2019).
127 United States v. Pratt, No. 4:16-cv-00108-DCN, 2017 WL 4341850 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2017).
128 Life ofAdministrative Democracy, supra note *.
129 Jess Gilbert, Agrarian Intellectuals in a Democratizing State: A Collective Biography of USDA Leaders
in the Intended New Deal, in THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF THE MODERN STATE 213, 220-21
(Catherine McNicol Stock & Robert D. Johnston eds., 2001).
130 Id.
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laws that govern them is an obvious manifestation of this belief. The related ideals
of deliberative democracy and civic republicanism offer another justification for
elected farmer committees. Civic republicanism and deliberative democracy overlap
on the idea that "government's primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to
deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common
good." 131 Decentralized administrators based in local communities can certainly help
the process of deliberation and consensus-building. The problem with this
explanation is that the committees only welcome farmers to the deliberation. While
they scale properly, they do not properly invite the participation necessary for
genuine deliberation and consensus. The narrow scope of participation in the elected
committees better reflects the corporatist pluralism of the New Deal, which promised
that the government would merely mediate between various interests rather than
make proactive policy decisions.13 2 In this case, Congress and the Roosevelt
Administration determined that farmers, as an industry, should self-govern, but not
in a libertarian sense, instead giving elected farmers the authority to wield the
coercive power of government.133 By granting industry this authority, Congress was
able to establish needed regulations without industry opposition.1 3 4 Finally, the
electoral system may be the result of racist and elitist interests. Although elections
have a semblance of egalitarianism, when local leaders are able-as they originally
were-to establish the rules of elections, the elections become merely a means to
reinforce existing social structures.1 35
There was probably too little discussion about the motivations for using elected
farmer committees. One result of failing to articulate why such a unique system was
appropriate is that, in hindsight, it just seems obvious that "democracy" is best. But
that easy acceptance of an undefined "democracy" and easy dismissal of competing
"1 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1514 (1992).
132 James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 749-
50 (1991).
13 THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 68
(40th anniversary ed. 2009) (1969).
13 Id. at 77.
135 PETE DANIEL, DISPOSSESSION: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN FARMERS IN THE AGE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS 9-12 (2013); R.G. Tugwell & E.C. Banfield, Grass Roots Democracy-Myth or
Reality?, 10 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 47, 48-49 (1950) (reviewing PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS
ROOTS; A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION (1949)).
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justifications lets the electoral system entrench without meaningful critique. As a
result, the system has bred a variety of serious problems.136
The most basic underlying problem is that the committees have no clear
principal. Their role as administrators is to carry out Congress' prime directives and
USDA's regulatory policy. That requires fidelity to Congress and responsiveness to
political appointees and the President. Adding another layer of electoral oversight
may offer some degree of additional accountability and local engagement, but it
creates an impossible suite of bosses to whom the committees must answer,
generating unavoidable confusion. That fundamental confusion is evident in the
more specific problems that burden the elected farmer committees.
The remaining problems that plague the elected committees are overt racism,
inexpert administration, and general disinterest. The racial motivation of the
committees manifests into deeply rooted discrimination at the local level and within
central USDA.137 As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights once wrote, "The virtual
exclusion of Negroes from the [USDA farm program implementation] structure
poses one of the most serious problems with which the Department of Agriculture
should be concerned, particularly since this exclusion is compounded by the
discriminatory operation of the county committee elections."138 Also inherent in an
electoral structure is the lack of expertise that can come with popularity-based
selection. Elections may select the most popular, even the most proficient farmers,
but they do not select for those farmers who are most adept at administering federal
law. Critique after critique during the 20th Century points to the inability of
committees to carry out their responsibilities properly.139 Part of the problem with
inexpert administration is that most farmers were and are simply disinterested in the
farmer committees. Few people know of or understand the role of the farmer
13 In another article, I dedicate more attention to understanding both the ideological foundations and the
justifications for the elected committees. Life ofAdministrative Democracy, supra note *.
m There are two articles that specifically address the racial discrimination that has long been part of these
elected committees. These two articles happen to be the only other legal scholarship that has given
extended attention to the committees. See Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Farmers and Fair
Lending: Racializing Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN. L. & Pol'y Rev. 333 (2001); Note, The Federal
Agricultural Stabilization Program and the Negro, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1967); see also U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 115.
138 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 96 (1965).
139 Frischknecht, supra note 102, at 713; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REVIEW OF THE FARMER COMMITTEE
SYSTEM 1 (1962).
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committees.14 Even fewer people actually vote in committee elections: the most
recent voter turnout data shows only 9.4 percent participation, and the highest
participation in recent years was only 15 percent.141
The committees have important failings. That does not mean that the
committees are entirely a failure. Certainly, Congress and the USDA do not think
the committees are beyond saving, having reinvigorated them in the 1994 and 2002
Farm Bills. What is most interesting about that legislative action is that while it
formalized the electoral system far beyond its prior incarnations, it also took much
of the wind from the sails of local electoral decisionmaking. The 2002 Farm Bill, for
instance, allows the Secretary to appoint committee members, outside of the election
system, if the election results do not sufficiently reflect local demographics.1 42 I take
this as a positive change to increase diversity and blunt the racial history of farm
program implementation. However, according to extensive interviews conducted by
Nate Rosenberg, a lawyer and scholar of civil rights at the USDA, it seems farmers
and farm advocates report hat the change has had little to no effect on the
discriminatory nature of the committees.14 3
Moreover, the appointment process does undercut electoral purity. In 1994
Congress also engineered a major overhaul of USDA, which included the creation
of a National Appeals Division to hear appeals across the USDA programs.144 The
new creation does not explicitly remove powers from the elected committees, but
final committee decisions are now reviewable not by local elected farmers, but in the
final instance by those dreaded, unelected, experts in D.C.
The interplay between the elected committees and employees or appointed
leadership in D.C. is a critical element in understanding the full scope of committee
authority, responsibility, and their basic legal existence. The next section looks
14" E.g., Telephone Interview with Cara Fraver, Bus. Servs. Dir., Nat'l Young Farmer's Coal. (Mar. 11,
2019).
"I U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, NATIONAL BALLOTS CAST (2006), https://www.fsa.usda
.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/NewsRoom/County-Committee-Elections/pdf/election-
results/2006electionresults.pdf.
12 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VII)(cc) (2018).
143 E-mail Interview with Nathan Rosenberg, Visiting Scholar, Food Law & Policy Clinic, Harvard Law
Sch. (June 7, 2019).
14 CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY, THE USDA NATIONAL APPEALS DIVISION: AN OUTLINE OF THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE 1 (2003), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/kelleynad.pdf;
Alan R. Malasky & William E. Penn, USDA Reorganization-Fact or Fiction?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1161,
1165 (1995).
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closely at the legal constitution of the elected committees before this Article turns to
a careful consideration of what that constitution means for committees' legality.
II. THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION OF ELECTED FARMER
COMMITTEES
The history, responsibility, and various competing and complementary
justifications for the elected USDA farmer committees together paint a picture of a
widespread, complex, and longstanding system that administers many aspects of
federal agriculture law. That elected officials populate the system sets it apart from
any similarly large and powerful unit in the federal government, so a closer look at
the legal nuances of the electoral system is in order. This section will consider the
specific nature of electoral "appointment" by looking at how members are seated on
farmer committees, how they are supervised, and to whom they are ultimately
responsible. Answers to these technical statutory questions will help to further
explore the constitutional aspects of farmer committees, which is the subject of the
next section.
A. County Committees are Formally "Appointed" By Electors
It is one thing to say that a farmer committee is elected. It is another thing to
explore what exactly that means. For instance, Part I of this Article briefly described
the USDA commodity committees. These committees are distinct from the county
committees as the commodity committees have a much larger geographic reach and
much narrower substantive jurisdiction, related only to very specific farm products
such as Texas oranges or California raisins.145 The commodity committees are, to an
extent, elected. But a closer look at the regulatory structure of the commodity
committees shows that the elections are only a process for recommending appointees
to the Secretary of Agriculture.146 It may be that the appointment is pro forma, and
the Secretary makes no independent judgment, but it is nevertheless the case that the
formal legal action for seating a commodity committee member is not an election
but a traditional secretarial appointment. The same is not true for the county farmer
committees.
". See supra Part I.
146 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 905.23(a) (2020) (establishing that the Secretary of USDA "shall" select members
from the list of elected nominees "or from other qualified persons."); see also id. § 906.23 ("The Secretary
may select members of the committee and alternates from nominations which may be made in the
following manner....").
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The county farmer committees are, in both the practical and formal sense,
seated through an election, not through a secretarial appointment. This fact is obvious
on the face of the statute. Title 16, Section 590h of the United States Code stablishes
the state and county committees.14 7 With respect to the state committees, the law is
clear: "The Secretary shall appoint in each State a State committee .. ."148 By
contrast, while the Secretary "shall establish" county committees,149 the law also
provides that the committee "shall consist of not fewer than 3 nor more than 5
members that ... are elected by the agricultural producers.1.. 50
It is true that the statute also provides for limited appointments to the county
committees, but this serves to further cement the conclusion that the normal method
of seating is elections. In response to the widespread racial discrimination that the
county committees have wrought, Congress amended the electoral process in several
ways. Most importantly, the Secretary "may ensure inclusion of socially
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers through provisions allowing for the appointment
of 1 additional voting member .15. "11 The contrast between the explicit language
about appointing state committees or socially disadvantaged members to the county
committees, and electing the general membership should put to rest any question
about the formal means of seating committees. Committees are seated by elections.
If further evidence is needed,15 2 one can look to the level of thought Congress
put into assuring that the elections are fair and open. It would be difficult to explain
such congressional ttention to a process that was merely preliminary to a secretarial
appointment. For instance, Congress has detailed: timelines for public notice of
117 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2018).
148 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(A).
149 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(i)(I).
151 Id. § 590h(5)(B)(ii)(I). The fact that only farmers are eligible to elect the county committees may raise
a constitutional issue in addition to those discussed later in this Article. The Supreme Court has held that
restricting votes to only a subset of eligible voters may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. See
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
151 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VII)(cc) (2018).
152 I emphatically do not think more evidence is needed, but in developing this Article many colleagues
remarked that certainly these committees are only functionally and not formally elected. I belabor the
point here only to overcome what seems to be a natural presumption among administrative law scholars
against believing that administrators could actually be elected.
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elections;5 3 assurances against opening ballots in advance of the noticed date;L"
guarantees of transparent ballot counting;155 reporting requirements for each election
that committees must submit with specific data and on a short timeline;156 a national
report that the Secretary must release summarizing the aggregate election data;157
and, finally, the process by which USDA should promulgate more detailed election
guidelines if necessary.158 These are not the sort of details on which Congress would
dwell if they were only establishing a show election. It is even less likely that the
USDA would use resources to promulgate further election details if it were possible
for the Secretary, at his discretion, to simply overrule the election results and appoint
members of his choosing. In fact, USDA issued interim national election guidelines
in 2012 and finalized those guidelines in 2013.159
B. Committee Members are Not Removable by the President or
a Presidential Appointee
While the question of appointment is clear, the question of removal is more
nuanced. There are no statutory provisions for removal, but USDA regulations claim
that elected committee members are removable only for cause. The committee
members, then, may legally answer to both their voting constituency and supervisors
within the USDA. But it is not clear that the for-cause removal regulation is valid in
light of a statutory scheme that clearly presumes electoral, not bureaucratic,
supervision.
The regulations purport to establish a for-cause removal system for elected
committee members. The Deputy Administrator for the Farm Service Agency holds
the removal authority.160 The Deputy Administrator may remove elected committee
members "for failure to perform the duties of their office, impeding the effectiveness
of any program administered in the county, violating official instructions, or for
153 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(aa) (2018).
154 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(bb).
155 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(cc).
156 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(V).
157Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VI).
158 Id. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VII).
159 7 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2020).
160 Id. § 7.29(a).
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misconduct."161 This is certainly a for-cause removal structure, with only a limited
scope of reasons that can justify removal, and the USDA recognizes it as such: the
heading of this section of the regulations is "Removal from office or employment for
cause."6 2 In addition to the for-cause provision, the Deputy Administrator can only
remove an elected member of a committee after the member receives written notice
of the reason for removal, an opportunity to reply to the notice, and an opportunity
for appeal of the removal decision.6 3 Both the limited criteria for removal and the
detailed removal procedures create a robust but not absolute tenure protection during
each three-year term in office.
The fact that there is not complete protection, however, raises a red flag.
Congress provided for elected farmer committees and nowhere created a mechanism
for removal outside of the electoral process.164 USDA established the removal
restrictions through regulation,"' under a general grant of authority to make rules
"relating to the selection and exercise of the functions of the respective committees,
and to the administration through such committees of the programs described. ... "166
It is not clear that this delegation of authority includes the authority to regulate
removal. Were the removal restrictions focused only on appointed state committees,
there would be little reason to question their propriety, as the statute authorizes the
secretary to make appointments and then grants authority to promulgate rules related
to the committees. In those circumstances, the authority to remove, or regulate
removal, seems a natural counterpart to the authority to appoint and is significantly
bolstered by the grant of rulemaking authority.
The elected committees are structured differently. The Secretary has no
authority to appoint the general membership of the county committees, as their
selection is left to voters.167 As a general rule, "the appointing official," in this case
the county electorate, "is considered to have the removal power unless otherwise
161 Id. § 7.28(a).
162 Id. § 7.28.
163 Id. § 7.28(b).
164 See 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5) (2018) (providing for the election of county committee members and
detailing the process of election, but not including any provisions for removal).
165 7 C.F.R. § 7.28 (2020) (incorporating an earlier interim rule which specifically includes the regulatory
language on removal, 77 Fed. Reg. 33063-01, 33075 (June 5, 2012)).
166 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(E) (2018).
167 Save for the appointment of a single representative of socially disadvantaged farmers. Id.
§ 590h(b)(5)(B)(ii)(III).
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specified by statute."168 And the statute here creating the electoral system says
nothing of removal. Without authority to appoint, in fact, with authority explicitly
granted to voters and not the Secretary, more justification is needed if one is to infer
authority to remove. The grant of rulemaking powers might be the additional
justification needed, except that the rulemaking delegation is not open-ended. The
rulemaking authority is limited only to: "selection," which is relevant only to those
members the Secretary may select, the state committee members and representatives
of socially disadvantaged farmers; "exercise of [] functions," which deals with
committee activities, but not their constitution; and "administration through such
committees of the programs described [earlier in the statute] ... ," which also deals
with committee activities and not committee make-up.169 The lack of inherent
authority to remove that is associated with the initial authority to appoint, as well as
the lack of authority to promulgate rules related to removal, strongly suggests that
Congress did not authorize USDA to include removal provisions in its regulations.
When Congress provides for administrative elections, it is fair to assume that it
has not implicitly granted removal authority to other administrators. If Congress
intends to grant removal authority to an actor other than the appointing authority-
in this case, to the agency rather than the voters-it must be explicit.?17 The very
nature of an electoral system is to turn authority over to voters. It would be an
arduous reading of the statute to find that Congress wanted to give voters
appointment authority and then, by vague implication, hollow that authority by
making it dependent on bureaucratic consent. In simpler terms, when voters are given
the power to elect, the power to remove also lies with the voters absent statutory
removal provisions.171
While the USDA has established a careful and limited system of only for-cause
removal, the face of the statute and the obvious proposition of an electoral scheme
show that only the end of a statutory term of office or the will of voters are valid
168 Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An
Analysis ofRecentAmerican Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 552 (2018); see Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (stating that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment); see
also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) (holding that the Constitution does not grant
inherent removal authority in the President and no such authority is implied from congressional silence.
On the contrary, silence, in a larger statutory scheme that reflects insulation from the President, implies
limited rather than expansive removal authority.).
169 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(E) (2018).
17" See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 168, at 552.
171 See id.
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forms of removal from an elected farmer committee. The only argument against this
reading is the canon of constitutional avoidance. As the next section demonstrates,
both the electoral mode of appointment and removal restrictions may not be
constitutionally viable forms under the emerging Presidentialist administrative law
doctrine. That is as much an indictment of the Presidentialist theory as it is of the
elected committees.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO ELECTORAL
DEMOCRACY
The United States Supreme Court's approach to administrative law over the
past decade has turned sharply to a doctrine demanding presidential control.172 The
requirement of unified presidential control presents a constitutional threat to electoral
administration, especially as manifest in elected farmer committees. Recent cases
from the Court, principally Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,173 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,17 '
and, to a lesser extent, Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission,175 reveal a
doctrine of presidential power as against partial bureaucratic independence.
Presidentialist heory and doctrine are both placed in an awkward situation, however,
when we recognize that the dichotomy may not always be President versus
bureaucrats, or even President versus Congress, but sometimes President versus
voters, as is the case with electoral administration.
This section describes how the modern Presidentialist doctrine has picked a
clear winner, the President, all the while thinking that it was picking the President
over dubious, isolated bureaucrats rather than local, elected administrators. The next
section points out the consequence of that outcome: Presidentialist doctrine grows
out of a promise of accountability, but the doctrine rejects the accountability that
arguably comes with electoral administration.176 The rejection of electoral
172 Mashaw & Berke, supra note 168, at 614; Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2017).
173 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) ("The ntire 'executive
Power' belongs to the President alone.")
1 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
175 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
176 I use the term "Presidentialist" here to recognize a theory and doctrine of robust presidential authority
even in the face of congressional attempts to limit presidential control or to spread authority throughout
the executive branch. The phrase Unitary Executive would also be apt. I acknowledge that there are
nuances between Presidentialist and Unitary Executive theories. Compare, e.g., Kagan, supra note 10, at
2326 (promoting the idea of presidential control but distancing herself from Unitary Executive theory),
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administration is almost certainly the correct outcome, given the practical and
constitutional failures the farmer committees demonstrate. But the rejection of
electoral administration that is necessarily part of a Presidentialist doctrine does not
recommend unified presidential power as the alternative. Instead, as the final section
of this Article will explain, the rejection of electoral administration demonstrates the
error of one-dimensional thinking about democratic legitimacy. It demonstrates the
error of promising that democratic legitimacy is merely majoritarian vote counting,
whether that vote counting is for federal administrators or the President.
This section will first describe Presidentialist theory. It will next briefly
highlight how the theory has emerged in recent Supreme Court doctrine related
particularly to presidential removal authority. This section concludes by applying
appointment and removal rules to the elected farmer committees, explaining that
under the current doctrine the Court must reject electoral administration.
A. Presidentialist Theory
The theory of Presidentialism finds its roots in both the Constitution and
normative political arguments."?' The essence of the constitutional argument is
textual and structural. The textual argument posits that the Vesting Clause of Article
II-"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America" ? 8-is an exclusive grant of executive power to a single President.179
Where Congress diffuses the power to administer laws throughout the executive
branch and limits presidential control thereof, Congress has violated the Vesting
Clause, shifting execution of laws to a unit other than the President.180 There may be
a variety of agencies, cabinet departments, presidential advisors, and others within
the Executive Branch, but the Constitution "eliminates conflicts in law enforcement
and regulatory policy by ensuring that all of the cabinet departments and agencies
with Calabresi, supra note 9 (describing and supporting Unitary Executive theory and not relying on the
term "presidentialism"). But those nuances are not essential and not relevant to the argument that doctrine
arising from the theories would reject electoral administration.
177 Kagan, supra note 10, at 2325-26 (supportingboththe textualist and political claims); Calabresi, supra
note 9, at 59 (supporting the political claim); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-71 (1994) (supporting the textualist
claim).
178 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
179 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020); CALABRESI & YOO,
supra note 8, at 3.
"' E.g., Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2205; CALABRESI & YoO, supra note 8, at 3.
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that make up the federal government will execute the law in a consistent manner and
in accordance with the president's wishes."181 This argument further looks to the
Take Care Clause and reasons that the clause demands the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,"8 2 and without direct control over
administrators, the President cannot "take care."18 3
The textual argument is paired with a structural argument, with precisely the
same consequences. The structural argument points not only to the Vesting Clause
of Article II, but to the vesting clauses of each of the first three articles of the
Constitution, manifesting the separation of powers between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches.184 Having defined which powers belong to which
unit of the federal government, the argument goes, Congress cannot then create
administrative units that are not wholly devoted to the President, insulated from the
President, or, worse, subject to congressional or judicial control.185 As professors
Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash, leading proponents of the unitary executive
theory, argue, this "exclusive trinity of powers" is the only permissible constitutional
structure, and an administrative body not under the exclusive control of the President
is an impermissible "fourth" branch of the government.186
Accepting that the Constitution's text unambiguously and exclusively puts the
President in charge of the execution of federal law, it follows that Congress cannot
limit or fracture the President's unified authority by allowing a subordinate
administrator to make decisions that the president herself is not allowed to make, or
by restricting her ability to control administrators, including removing them from
office. 187
This textualist approach to unitary presidential control is reasonable, but it is
also controversial.188 Professors Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein, for instance, have
181 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 8, at 3.
182 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
183 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2198; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177, at 582-84.
184 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177, at 663.
185 Id. at 559-60.
186 Id. at 560.
187 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177, at 599; Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
188 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLuM. L.
REV. 1(1994) (arguing that the text of the Constitution is much more ambiguous as to presidential control
of administration than others have proposed); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177 (responding directly
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written: "the view that the framers constitutionalized anything like the [unitary
Presidentialist] vision is just plain myth." 189 Lessig and Sunstein remind that the
theory of pure presidential power seems to make other constitutional text
"unnecessary scribbles."190 For instance, what is the purpose of a clause allowing the
President to demand reports from the heads of departments if those departments are
not distinctive units, but instead part of the unitary President?91 They also point out
that when we read the vesting clauses, we read them with modern conceptions of the
presidency and do not appreciate that they meant something quite different at the
time the Constitution was ratified.192 To oversimplify, Lessig and Sunstein
demonstrate that "executive power" today seems to mean power to lead and
administer, but to the framers "executive" meant the political authority of a head-of-
state to lead, rather than the administrative authority to manage.193 A modern
example of this distinction might be found in the line of presidential succession. The
Secretary of State is the first non-elected official in that chain.194 Elevating a
representative of state to fill the presidency is arguably a demonstration that the
office was, and still could be, seen primarily as one of political leadership, a
figurehead of state. If the framers indeed meant that the "executive power" was the
power of a political leader and not necessarily the power of a managerial
administrator, then a more diverse administrative structure, in which Congress is
more creative about how it delegates authority, is constitutionally welcome.
While the constitutional argument is controversial, the political argument is not.
The political argument asserts that federal bureaucrats are unelected and therefore
to Lessig and Sunstein and attempting to lay out the textualist argument in greater detail); see also Robert
V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51
DUKE L.J. 963, 1011 (2001) ("By this view, the president may advise agency heads concerning his views
on particular rules, but the president has no authority to dictate regulatory decisions entrusted to
them .... ").
189 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 2.
190 Id. at 13.
191 Id. at 38.
192 Id. at 12-13.
193 Id. at 39-40. JulianMortenson takes a different approach to this argument in a new article that explores
the understanding of "executive power" in the early republic, and he also concludes that the early
understanding was not one of pure presidential administration, but of presidential execution under the
direction of Congress. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169 (2019).
194 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2018).
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unaccountable. Everybody agrees that bureaucrats are unelected and, therefore,
without more, lack political legitimacy.195 By tying these unelected bureaucrats
directly to presidential control, however, the President's democratic authority can
legitimize them. Even Sunstein, for instance, a critic of the Presidentialist argument,
has written that "the modern administrative agency has attenuated the links between
citizens and governmental processes."196 Interestingly, the same critique about the
electoral disconnect has been levied at courts, questioning the legitimacy of judicial
195 The agreement that agencies are not directly democratically accountable is far reaching and comes
from both defenders and critics of the administrative state. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 13, at 453, 505
(asserting that accountability is a problem in the administrative state and an argument for the unitary
executive); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that a policy argument for the unitary executive
is to create accountability); Bressman, supra note 11, at 462, 478 (recounting the argument that important
policy decisions should be made only by elected officials and lamenting the almost uniform focus on
majority rule); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000)
("The inquiry into accountability in administrative law currently focuses inordinately on formal
accountability to the three branches of government."); Kagan, supra note 10, at 2354; Maggie McKinley,
Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1619 (2018) (identifying the
presumption underlying many critiques of the administrative state that voting is the only form of
legitimacy and representation); Stewart, supra note 14, at 1801-02 (lamenting the lack of legitimacy in
exercising power without electoral accountability and thinking through the possibility of elected
administrators); MASHAW, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that electoral legitimacy in the administrative state
is indirect, coming from presidential appointment, Senate confirmation, and congressional delegations of
authority); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985) (arguing that the President's direct electoral position helps legitimize
broad administrative discretion); Metzger, supra note 172, at 36 (noting that one of the key attacks on the
administrative state is the argument that administration is undemocratic); Clark, supra note 102, at 483
("[H]ow [could] the broad powers delegated to the administrative branch... be exercised in a manner
most consistent with our democratic traditions."); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case
for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 140 (2000) (suggesting that administrative agencies are
better than courts at making policy choices because although agencies, like courts, "lack democratic
accountability," at least the President and Congress can check agencies); BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC'S
LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 150 (2019) ("why, and under what
conditions, [is it] appropriate for unelected officials and administrative organizations to exercise political
authority."); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497-98 (2010) ("The
people do not vote for the 'Officers of the United States."') (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2);
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-86 (1984) (explaining that
agencies have more claim to policy decisions than courts because agencies are politically accountable
through congressional delegations and the electoral authority of the presidential administration); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (leaving broad policy choices to administrators
risks "unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 728-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The prosecutors who exercise this awesome discretion are
selected and can be removed by a President, whom the people have trusted enough to elect. Moreover, [if
there is misbehavior] the President pays the cost in political damage to his administration.") The list
certainly goes on.
196 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 453, 505.
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review from unelected judges.197 Scholars have long answered that critique by
turning to the democracy-enhancing nature of appointment and moderate political
insulation.198
The concern with democratic legitimacy in the administrative state goes back
in time and spreads beyond the bounds of the modern debate over presidential
control. Dale Clark, a USDA administrator who in 1939 wrote about the elected
farmer committees, was himself thinking in these terms. When implementing
significant delegations of authority, he wrote, we must consider "how the broad
powers delegated to the administrative branch could be exercised in a manner most
consistent with our American democratic traditions."199 Nearly 50 years later,
Professor Stewart asked the same question as he sought to understand the major
trends in administrative law, opening The Reformation ofAdministrative Law with
an epigraph lamenting that administrative policymaking is not "reconciled with the
processes of democratic consultation, scrutiny and control."200
Obviously, the strongest advocates of stout Presidentialism have made the
democratic argument. Calabresi and Yoo wrote that lodging all power in the
President "promotes accountability,"201 while Professor Calabresi explains that "the
President is unique in our constitutional system as being the only official who is
accountable to a national voting electorate and no one else. As we have seen, this
constitutes the President's unique claim to legitimacy. ... "202 Both ideologically and
temporally, the legal academy has consistently found that democratic legitimacy is
either lacking in a bureaucracy or unique in a President.
Federal courts agree. The late Judge Patricia Wald, one of the leading voices
on administrative law in the federal judiciary, worried in Sierra Club v. Costle, about
"unelected administrators."203 Judge Wald was considered a liberal jurist, but her
197 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
198 E.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 65 (2001).
199 Clark, supra note 102, at 483.
200 Stewart, supra note 14, at 1669 (citing Aneurin Bevan, in THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON DELEGATED
LEGISLATION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1953, at 144, quoted in C.K. ALLEN, LAW AND ORDERS 164-65
(3d ed. 1965)).
201 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 8, at 3.
202 Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59.
203 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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former colleague, the quite conservative Justice Scalia, writing for a Supreme Court
majority, also looked askance at "unelected federal bureaucrats."204
Likely the strongest judicial critique of the democratic legitimacy of unelected
administrators is from Free Enterprise Fund, in which Chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion opens with the argument that if administrators are exercising power
in the people's name, they must be responsible to the President, who is the people's
representative.20 "The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of
accountability," wrote the Court, and continued "[t]he people do not vote for the
'Officers of the United States."'206 Since the administration is unelected, Roberts
explained, there must be an electoral connection to make administration legitimate
and accountable. That connection is to the President: "No one doubts Congress's
power to create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy. But where, in all this, is the
role for oversight by an elected President? The Constitution requires that a President
chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of laws." 207 Only when the
President has control over bureaucrats is democratic legitimacy present, Roberts
reasoned. The philosophical demand for democratic legitimacy, therefore, links
presidential control to administrative action. Without that link, the administrative
state "may slip from the Executive's control, and thus from that of the people." 208
The Chief's and the Court's language about the legitimacy of administrators was not
as grand, but the implication was just as plain in Seila Law, where the Justice Thomas
reiterated that "[t]he people do not vote for the 'Officers of the United States"209 and
the Court held that as a general rule, at-will removal is constitutionally necessary to
protect presidential power.2 10
The widespread agreement among scholars and jurists on the need for electoral
legitimacy makes the doctrinal aspects of Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, and
204 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305 (2013).
205 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010). It is worth noting
that the rhetoric of Presidentialism in this case rings louder than the actual impacts on presidential power
since the decision gives the SEC more power than it gives the president.
206 Id. at 497-98 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl. 2).
207 Id. at 499.
208 Id.
209 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2212 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497-98).
210 Id. at 2198 ("Free Enterprise Fund left in place two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal
power.").
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similar cases, seem almost foregone. The next part will sketch that doctrine and how
it applies to elected bureaucrats.
B. Presidentialist Doctrines and the Rejection of Electoral
Administration
Presidentialist thinking is changing, or could change, many aspects of
administrative law, including congressional delegation to officers other than the
President,211 the standard expectations of judicial scrutiny, transparency, regulatory
authority, and more.212 Arguably, however, the ideas have made the most significant
inroads in the doctrine surrounding appointment and removal of administrative
officers. These are also the areas of most interest in a discussion of electoral
administration given that elections are, at least, just tools for appointment and
removal. This part will demonstrate why, under today's Supreme Court doctrine, the
elected committees are unconstitutional.
1. Appointment
The elected farmer committees have all the markings of officers of the United
States, which means that the electoral mode of selection violates the Appointments
Clause. This conclusion follows the Supreme Court's recent articulation of
Appointments Clause doctrine in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission,213
as well as earlier cases.214 Lucia reiterates that the Appointments Clause provides
three constitutional options for the appointment of "Officers of the United States,"
211 In the case of elected county committees, the congressional delegation of authority is not only to
officers other than the President, it is arguably a delegation of public power to private industry. This raises
the issue of private non-delegation. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Dep't. of
Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 45-46 (2015). That constitutional issue-however interesting,
important, and possibly fatal to the committees-is outside the scope of this Article for two reasons. First,
the doctrine is less clear than appointment and removal and the Court would likely find flaws with the
electoral structures under the latter doctrines more readily than private nondelegation. Second,
appointment and removal are more closely aligned with presidential power and majoritarian thought than
private nondelegation, so they provide a better framework for thinking through electoral administration.
Of course, private non-delegation invites careful consideration of how power is wielded and transferred,
of modes of participation in government, and of due process. The question, therefore, is not irrelevant, but
better left to another day.
212 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183; Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct.
1649 (2020).
213 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
214 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976); Freytag v.
Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
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and an election is not among those options.2" The central question in Lucia was,
therefore, how to determine which government actors are indeed "officers" subject
to constitutional appointment.216 Lucia offers a two-part test for making that
determination.217 The first prong asks whether the government position in question
is congressionally created and permanent.218 The second prong asks whether that
position exercises significant authority.2 19
With respect to the first part of the test, regarding permanence and
congressional authorization, there is no doubt that the farmer committees are both
established by Congress and permanent. In their current incarnation, the farmer
committees are a creature of statute, as the law provides for "Establishment and
elections for county, area, or local committees."220 The farmer committees, locally
oriented as they are, distinctly carry out federal law. Regarding permanence, the
farmer committees are unquestionably continuing as opposed to ad hoc agencies.
The committees are empowered by statute, not by administrative design or temporary
necessity. While the statute provides mechanisms for the consolidation of specific
farmer committees, there is no built-in sunset provision for any given committee or
the larger committee system.22 1
As expected, the more difficult issue is the second prong of Lucia's officer test,
which asks whether the farmer committees wield significant authority. Similar to the
special tax judges under consideration in Freytag v. Commissioner,222 the farmer
committees are parts of a larger regulatory scheme in which they often do not issue
215 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050.
216 Id. at 2049. Given electoral appointment, there is no reason to struggle with the question of whether
the committees are principal or inferior officers. In either case, the Constitution does not allow electoral
appointment. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
217 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
218 Id. A 2019 decision from the First Circuit sees this, probably correctly, as two questions and therefore
turns the Lucia test into three prongs rather than two, asking whether "(1) the appointee occupies a
'continuing' position established by federal law; (2) the appointee exercises ignificant authority; and
(3) the significant authority is exercises pursuant o the laws of the United States." Aurelius Inv., LLC v.
Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 842 (1st Cir. 2019), rev'd on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
219 Lucia, 135 S. Ct. at 2052.
220 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B) (2018).
221 Id. § 590h(b)(5) (establishing the farmer committee system but not providing for automatic or
inevitable termination).
222 Freytagv. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
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final decisions because their actions are subject to higher-level review by the Farm
Service Agency Administrator, the state committees, and the USDA's National
Appeals Division.2 23 But Freytag held that finality does not decide the question of
officialdom, rather scope-of-authority does.224 And the scope of the farmer
committees' authority goes well beyond the adjudicatory oversight of the special tax
judges. Farmer committees do oversee adjudicatory proceedings when they make
individualized decisions about, for instance, farm program eligibility, but they also
make legislative-type judgments on county-wide policies such as final planting dates
for covered crops and the availability of federal programs.225 There is wide discretion
in many committee judgments, such as the judgment to grant exemptions from
conservation programs if compliance with such programs would cause a "hardship"
to the participating farmer.226 There is also wide discretion in the procedures that the
committees use in exercising their authority. Lucia points to the wide discretion
Congress gave to the Security and Exchange Committee's Administrative Law
Judges in that case,227 but Congress has not provided any boundaries to guide farmer
committees in their decisionmaking. As the Farm Service Agency itself declares, the
elected committees "use their judgment" to administer federal farm programs.228 In
addition to all the power the committees exercise directly, they also hire the Farm
Service Agency executive director for their county.229 The person in that position is
a full-time USDA employee and holds ignificant authority to administer farm
programs, including "staffing the county office; receiving, disposing of, and
accounting for county office property and money; advising the county committee on
election procedures; and assisting the county committee."230 In addition to the power
to hire and fire, which goes far beyond the power of any Administrative Law Judge
or special tax judge, all of the executive director's powers can be imputed to the
223 7 C.F.R. § 7.1(a), (c) (2020); id. § 11.5(a).
224 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
225 See supra Section I C.
226 STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 117, at 2.
" 7 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018).
228 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, COUNTY COMMITTEE ELECTIONS FACT SHEET-2018
(2018), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/FactSheets/2018/COC_fact_
sheet may-2018.pdf.
229 7 C.F.R. § 1230.607 (2020).
231 CANADA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 120, at 5.
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committees themselves because th  county executive director is an agent of a
committee.
Though no decision of a committee is final, and though the USDA leadership
ultimately retains all statutory authority, the breadth of adjudicatory and legislative
discretionary powers that originate with the committees places them in even a narrow
conception of "officers of the United States." Their authority is more diverse than
that of the special tax judges or the SEC's Administrative Law Judges, and the Court
has been clear, on repeated occasions, that finality and intervening authority
elsewhere in an agency do not categorically remove an administrator from the
"officer" category.231
Because the committees' authority goes well beyond the authority of other
administrators that the Supreme Court has already ruled are "officers," it is clear that
the elected farmer committees are also subject to constitutional appointment
standards. However, in June 2020 the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Financial
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC,232
which, read too quickly, provides a shadow of support for the constitutionality of
electoral appointment. This case stems from the creation of the Financial Oversight
and Management Board of Puerto Rico, which is made up of officials appointed by
the president without Senate confirmation.233 The challengers asserted that members
of the Board were indeed principal "Officers of the United States" and, therefore,
their appointment required Senate approval.234 The Court held that appointment
without Senate consent does not violate the Appointments Clause.235 In its opinion,
the Court writes that the application of the Appointments Clause "turns on whether
the Board members have primarily local powers and duties."2 36 Out of context, this
quote suggests that restrictions of the Appointments Clause may not apply to the
elected farmer committees because they apply federal law only within their very
local jurisdictions. If the Appointments Clause does not apply, then elections would
be an acceptable mode of appointment. However, upon closer reading, the Court's
reasoning here does not apply to the local farmer committees because the "local"
231 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
232 Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
233 Id. at 1654.
231 Id. at 1657-58.
235 Id. at 1665.
236 Id. at 1658.
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designation to which the Court refers is not any local administration but specifically
to local administrators established under "two provisions of the Constitution [that]
empower Congress to create local offices for the District of Columbia and for Puerto
Rico and the Territories."237 In other words, local administrators empowered under
the Territories Clause have a unique place because they are not, strictly speaking,
"Officers of the United States."238 Without question, this territorial exemption does
not apply to the USDA farmer committees.
Because the elected farmer committees are permanent and authoritative
administrators, and officers of the United States, for the purposes of the
Appointments Clause, they can only be appointed according to the terms of that
Clause. Of course, the Clause distinguishes between "officers" and "inferior
officers," but in either case, the Constitution does not recognize electoral
appointment.239
Normatively underlying all of this thinking is the persistent worry that federal
administration is not democratically accountable. This is especially true in the
thinking of Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who argue that even more federal
government employees should be subject to constitutional appointment.240 But the
farmer committees are unconstitutionally populated because of their majoritarian
accountability. This surprise is even more acute with respect to the Court's current
thinking on removing officers from their administrative posts.
2. Removal
Locating the power to remove administrative officers and determining the
boundaries of that power is orders of magnitude more difficult than understanding
the Appointments Clause because the Appointments Clause is explicit about
appointments and silent on removal. As a result, the contours of removal doctrine
are traced from the implications of the Appointment Clause, the Take Care Clause,
and, as with appointments, notions of the President's democratic legitimacy in
comparison to the bureaucracy's alleged democratic deficit.241 Even more than
237 Id. at 1654 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.)
238 Id. at 1658.
239 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
240 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
241 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484, 497 (2010).
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appointments, removal is infused with breathless agonizing over the legitimacy of
the bureaucracy and lavish admiration of the President's special democratic
accountability.242
The Court's leading modern cases on removal are 2020's Seila Law v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau241 and 2010's Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board.24 4 Although both articulate important
doctrine and offer important insight into Presidentialism, Free Enterprise Fund
proves more relevant to the case of elected administrators because it deals with multi-
member agencies and distributed removal authority while Seila Law is largely
focused on single-headed agencies.245 Both cases, however, are also relevant here
because of their explicit and repeated focus on Presidentialism. The Court roots both
holdings in the idea that too much limitation of presidential authority is
unconstitutional because of the President's democratic legitimacy. For instance, the
Free Enterprise Fund Court wondered how an administrative agency could exercise
power "in the people's name" when that agency is not meaningfully controlled by
the President, who is the manifestation of the people's will. 24 6 The special connection
between the President and the people was no mere implication. "The Constitution
that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives
him the power to do so," wrote the Court.2 47 "[P]eople do not vote for
[administrators],"248 unlike the President, who is "chosen by the entire Nation."249
Thus, when unelected administrators are not properly accountable to the President,
the administrative state "may slip from the Executive's control, and thus from that
of the people."20
Removal has some nuances, but we can synthesize it without political theory.
After Seila Law, the general rule for removal seems to be that Congress may not limit
242 E.g., Free Enter. Fund, 591 U.S. at 499; Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for
Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1257 (2014).
243 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183.
244 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
245 
Id. at 484; Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
246 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497.
247 
Id. at 513.
248 Id. at 497-98.
249 Id. at 499.
250 Id.
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the President's authority to remove officers except in certain limited cases.25
Specifically, from older precedent, Congress may not insert itself into the removal
process.2 2 Congress may not limit removal of the President's closest advisors or
those who play an inherently executive role-those whose power comes from the
President rather than from Congress.25 3 Congress may not tie the President's hands
to the point of ineffectiveness,254 or limit at-will removal of single-headed agency
directors.2" While Congress may prohibit the President from firing some officers as
described below, somebody in the administration must have the authority to remove
that officer, even if only for-cause, and whoever that somebody is, the President must
have authority to remove her.256
What Congress may do is limit a President's authority to remove certain
officers for purely political reasons, using for-cause provisions, so long as the
protected officer is; (1) filling a congressionally-created inferior ffice that is not
part of the President's core executive functions;257 or (2) the protected officers are
principle officers who serve on an independent, multi-member commission with
partisan balance and the commission has only quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial,
but not executive functions.258
The elected county committees do not fit into this framework. They pose a
conundrum because they are entirely novel. They do not even use the standard tools
of administrative staffing. What we can confidently say about the farmer committees
is that they are multi-member and the statute provides for three-year terms of office
based on election, without provisions for removal.259 The regulations then provide a
strict for-cause removal protection, and the Deputy Administrator for the Farm
Service Agency may exercise that right of removal when a cause is found.260 The
251 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2206 (2020).
252 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
253 Id.
25' Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514.
255 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191-92.
256 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496.
257 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199-2200 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 662-63, 696-97 (1988)).
258 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
259 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iv) (2018).
260 7 C.F.R. § 7.28 (2020).
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Deputy Administrator is not a tenure-protected position, and the Secretary of the
USDA is a cabinet appointment, likewise removable at-will.261 Thus, by the terms of
the regulations, there is only a single for-cause limit. By these terms, to remove a
committee member for cause, the President must ask the Deputy Administrator to
act. Were the Deputy Administrator to refuse, the President could fire the deputy.
But elections provide a wrinkle in this structure.
As noted in Section IIB, because the statute calls for an electoral appointment
with term limits and is silent on removal, the appropriate reading of the statute is that
it does not provide removal authority to anybody in the Administration. The statute's
delegation of rulemaking authority is explicitly cabined and does not include
authority to make rules addressing removal. Thus, the regulatory for-cause provision
is not valid, and a reversion to the statutory terms leaves removal only in the hands
of voters.262 With removal limited to electors, there is no removal power in the
presidency, and as such, the electoral structure goes beyond the permissible
boundaries identified in any of the Court's removal decisions. As with the
appointment process, the removal provisions do not pass constitutional muster.
The Court's thinking on removal, and to a lesser extent appointment, has given
the President's purported electoral legitimacy almost unconditional weight and
therefore forecloses the possibility of relying on an alternative form of electoral
accountability to validate administrative authority-direct accountability to voters.
Because of the Court's focus on the President, the elected farmer committees would
not stand under judicial scrutiny. Whether this doctrine is the best reading of the
Constitution, or whether its application to the farmer committees is correct, the
analysis shows the importance of the President's majoritarian claim to both Court
and Presidentialist thinking. Presidentialist doctrine promises more majoritarian
accountability but turns its nose up at a majoritarian experiment untethered from the
President. To an extent, that is the way it should be, as the next two sections explain.
261 See 7 U.S.C. § 1-9097 (2018); 7 C.F.R. § 1-4290.3099 (2020) (establishing and regulating USDA
programs and administration without any stated limits on removal of Deputy Administrator, Farm Service
Agency).
262 The canon of constitutional avoidance might suggest that, in order to avoid a statutory construction
that would invalidate the electoral structure of the farmer committees, the Court would read Congress'
silence as enabling the for-cause removal rule. But the clarity of Congress on USDA's limited rulemaking
authority and the exceedingly clear establishment of an electoral rather than traditional appointment-
removal structure, would make any such construction a stretch that might tear the statute rather than bend
it into a constitutionally valid form.
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IV. THE PRESIDENTIALIST OBJECTION TO TOO MUCH
DEMOCRACY
This section argues that on one count Presidentialism, particularly as manifest
in appointment and removal doctrines, is right; electoral administration is not a valid
constitutional design.263 But that is a small victory because the larger problem of "too
much democracy" proves a failure of presidential theory. Presidentialist doctrine is
right that electoral administration is not a good constitutional model, but electoral
administration is not a good model because-like Presidentialist theory-electoral
administration puts too much emphasis on a one-dimensional oversimplification of
democracy. In fact, the problem is not that electoral administration is "too much"
democracy, but that Presidentialism and electoral administration both credit
democracy with too little nuance. This conclusion does not rely on the outcome of
appointment and removal doctrines as applied to electoral administration, but that
application does lay bare the oddity of such heavy reliance on majoritarianism in
administration.
This section demonstrates that despite Presidentialist attempts to prove the one-
dimensional theory with textual, structural, and theoretical arguments, those
arguments are not strong enough to sufficiently distinguish presidential
majoritarianism from majoritarian electoral administration. These models, similarly
justified, should similarly fall.
Debates about the legitimacy of the administrative state gravitate to questions
of democratic accountability. The concern is that "unelected bureaucrats" are not
accountable to the people. As James Landis said of the larger debate around the
administrative process, the "literature abounds with fulmination."264 But there are a
variety of solutions to the so-called democratic deficit. Some find legitimacy in
bureaucratic insulation that allows administrators to exercise technical expertise, or
"specialization."265 Others locate legitimacy in administrative reasoning and
263 I take no position on whether appointment and removal doctrines are correct as they stand, only that as
they stand, with their Presidentialist underpinnings, they clearly invalidate electoral administration.
264 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 22-23 (1938).
265 Id. at 4; Humphrey's Ex'rv. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) ("[I]ts members are called upon
to exercise the trained judgement of a body of experts 'appointed by law and informed by experience."');
Free Enter. Fundv. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 531 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("And this Court has recognized the constitutional legitimacy of a justification that rests agency
independence upon the need for technical expertise. . .. Here, the justification for insulating the 'technical
experts' on the Board from fear of losing their jobs due to political influence is particularly strong."); Seila
Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2236 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in part).
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deliberative participation.266  Sub-constitutional separation-of-powers within
agencies is another justification.267 But the solution that has made the most headway
in the halls of political power,268 and, most importantly, in the Supreme Court, is to
carefully subordinate administrators to the President, who can claim a particular
majoritarian mandate.269 This is the Presidentialist model.
The Presidentialist doctrine, premised as it is on bringing more majoritarian
power to administration, has focused too much on the President alone. Landis, again,
cautioned that "[s]uch apotheosizing obscures rather than clarifies thought."270
Luckily, the test case of elected farmer committees does not apotheosize; it clarifies.
That the Presidentialist doctrine will undermine other models of majoritarian
legitimation, such as the electoral administration seen in USDA's elected farmer
committees, helps us see the problems of Presidentialist overreliance on a too-simple
constriction of democratic legitimacy. Presidentialism rallies for majoritarian
accountability but retreats from a direct election.
The core concern of Presidentialist thinking and doctrine is that in certain
circumstances, Congress "withdraws from the President" proper oversight of her
administration and places that power instead in unelected bureaucrats.271 Although
not beyond dispute, there is a textual and structural constitutional argument for why
the President must retain this power regardless of her electoral credentials. Perhaps
given interpretive disputes, scholars and courts alike emphasize the essential
democratic function of Presidentialism. However, democratic validation, we can
266 Seidenfeld, supra note 131, at 1514; MASHAW, supra note 12.
267 E.g., Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation ofPowers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006); see Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of
Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 573 (2015).
268 CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 8, at 3; see also Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive
Branch Authority, 13 Op. O.L.C. 248 (1989); Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Question of Power, A Powerful
Questioner, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/06/us/a-question-of-power-a-
powerful-questioner.html (describing Attorney General Ed Meese's position on presidential authority
over the bureaucracy: "But he said the framers of the Constitution did not intend Federal agencies to be
independent of the President or to be run by bureaucrats who are not politically accountable.");
Memorandum from Bill Barr to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General
Steve Engel on Mueller's "Obstruction" Theory, para. 9 (June 8, 2018), https://int.nyt.com/data/
documenthelper/549-june-2018-barr-memo-to-doj-mue/b4c05e39318dd2d136b3/optimized/full.pdf.
269 E.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477; Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183,
2203 (2020).
270 LANDIS, supra note 264, at 4.
271 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495.
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now see, is not only in the President, but in some cases, it s also in bureaucrats:
elected bureaucrats. The example of elected bureaucrats forces us to confront the
Presidentialist insistence that constitutional ambiguity can only be read as
empowering the uniquely majoritarian President.
At this point, a Presidentialist would likely agree that the county committees
are officers of the United States, that they are indeed unconstitutionally appointed,
and that the USDA's for-cause removal rule is, at the very least, suspect. "But," the
Presidentialist might counter, "the constitutionalflaws of electoral administration do
not demonstrate aproblem with Presidentialism." "First," they would argue,
Presidentialism is a textual and structural argument.27 2 The theorizing
around democratic legitimacy is window dressing, not law. If the problems of
electoral administration prove that mere elections are not enough, that is because
Presidentialism is about the President's special responsibilities, not just his
electoral authority. 273 Second, even if it did come down to the normative
theoretical argument, the President is still unique and distinguishable from county
committees. 27 4
The Presidentialists' constitutional argument, discussed in Section IILA. says
that the vesting clauses of Articles I, II, and III demonstrate three distinct federal
powers, and Congress cannot design administrative offices that are not wholly at the
mercy of the President because that merges Article I and Article II powers.27
Further, the Vesting Clause of Article II vests the "executive Power" in "a
President."276 This allows for all executive authority to accumulate in a single
President, and none can reside in officers the President does not control. Finally, the
Take Care Clause requires that the President have as much power as necessary to
"take care" that the laws are faithfully executed, and limiting the President's power
272 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177, at 559-60.
273 Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59.
274 Id.
275 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177, at 559-60.
276 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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over administrators inhibits her ability to take care.2" Or so argue the
Presidentialists.
These readings are acceptable, but not unavoidable, and weaker than they may
first seem. The Take Care Clause may not be a limit on Congress' power to direct
how the laws are executed, for instance, but instead a demand that the President
executes the laws as Congress designed them.2 78 If the vesting clauses are meant to
establish an inviolable seal between different government powers, why would the
Opinions Clause explicitly give the President authority to demand opinions from her
executive officers? Would not the vesting of executive power imply, as the
Presidentialists demand, the inherent authority of the President to control
administrators?279 More broadly, why should we assume that vesting an "executive"
authority, which might mean a political authority, includes vesting an administrative
or managerial authority?280
The structural and textual arguments for presidential control are not so plain as
to end the search for normative theories to justify the constitutional readings. The
Presidentialist would then say that even without indisputable constitutional
directions, a doctrine of presidential control is proper because the President has a
unique claim of electoral legitimacy.2 "' One can imagine the following argument:
"We should discard elected bureaucrats but not discard the electoral justification
for presidentialist administration because the President is the only elected official
who represents the entire nation while the elected farmer committees represent more
parochial interests." This is the argument that Calabresi has already made, but
without the farmer committees in mind.282
This argument has two flaws. First, the President is not nationally elected; she
is elected through the states.283 States have plenary authority to select presidential
electors, and those electors are apportioned according to the size of the states.284 The
277 Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010); Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).
278 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 62.
279 Id. at 38.
280 Id. at 39-40.
281 Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59.
282 Id.
283 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
284 Id.
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Electoral College is certainly unique to the President, but it does not carry the same
sense of rarified national responsiveness as Professor Calabresi urges.285 For one
thing, the Electoral College is a constitutional structure designed to mitigate naked
majoritarianism.286 For another thing, it means that the President is more responsive
to large states with more electors.2 7 Moreover, practicalities of modern politics force
presidential candidates to focus not only on large states with more electors but also
only on large "purple" states that are not already statistically certain to vote for one
candidate or another.288 In practice then, a presidential candidate will focus time,
money, and policy proposals-and a sitting President will focus actual executive
authority-on Pennsylvania, Florida, Ohio, Michigan, and similarly large and
politically divided states.289 Primary elections similarly make the President more
representative of Iowa and New Hampshire than of the entire United States.290 And
finally, of course, five times in history and twice in the past four presidential
elections, the Electoral College resulted in a President who received fewer popular
votes than the opposing candidate.291
A similar argument in favor of Presidentialism might be that the President is
subject to a uniquely high level of public scrutiny through media, advocacy
organizations, partisan politics, and the like, which shines a bright and legitimizing
light on the President's behavior both before and after elections.292 This suggests
special presidential accountability and has appeal as a descriptive matter because
certainly there is an opportunity for accountability through careful scrutiny and
regular elections. Edward Rubin, however, has persuasively argued that elections are
285 Of course, Calabresi's argument on this front emerged in the early 1990s before the two modern
elections in which the winner of the popular vote lost the election in the Electoral College and in which
key battleground states gained the central role they currently play.
286 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).




290 Ronald Brownstein, The Early States' Stranglehold on the Presidential Primary, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/2020-primary-early-states-could-be-
crucial-ever/5 81146/.
291 D'Angelo Gore, Presidents Winning Without Popular Vote, FACTCHECK.ORG, https://www.factcheck
.org/2008/03/Presidents-winning-without-popular-vote/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2016).
292 See Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59, 62-63 (arguing that the national and national-electoral accountability
of the president makes her, and only her, appropriately subject to national scrutiny).
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more about representation than accountability, giving an opportunity for voters to
support the candidate who most clearly matches their interests rather than to hold
candidates accountable.293 Moreover, scrutiny and accountability do not offer much
analytically useful clarity. The President is subject to more scrutiny, which makes
presidential authority more normatively justifiable than, for example, elected farmer
committee authority. But the line-drawing problem built into this argument is too
great to overcome.
There must be an area above which public scrutiny is legitimizing and below
which lack of scrutiny is delegitimizing. Accepting for the sake of argument that the
county committees fall below and the President sits comfortably above, finding
agreement on the actual location of the gray area of questionable legitimacy is
probably an impossible task. On which side does a member of Congress sit? Does it
matter if the member represents Manhattan, New York or Manhattan, Montana? And
how would one aggregate these individual representatives with apparently variable
legitimacy into a single body, Congress, which must have a singular legitimate
authority?
Professor Miriam Seifter's work has addressed state administration.294 That
research demonstrates how the lack of attention to and oversight of state
administrators, many of whom are elected, drives a wedge between administrators
and the public.29 But that practical challenge cannot itself delegitimize state
government in part because state governments do not earn legitimacy from the
federal Constitution and also because esoterica and scrutiny are not manageable
standards. The impossibility of locating the area of legitimacy means it can only be
a qualitative argument and not one that provides a principle of constitutional law for
determining the proper level of oversight for any given public power.
To put the line-drawing concern slightly differently, when we begin to debate
the proper level of majoritarian representation and attention, we are debating
irreducible preferences-representation at the national level or the county level?
With 24-hour news scrutiny or only 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. news scrutiny? The
Constitution, conveniently, does not force us into that particular debate because it
provides a framework that balances majoritarianism with other tools of good
governance rather than only one tool that requires vague and undefinable line
drawing. The comparison between electoral administration and Presidentialism need
293 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2073, 2077-82 (2005).
294 Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 107
(2018).
295 Id. at 269-70.
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not be a comparison between scale in majoritarianism; it can be a lesson about
majoritarianism in a larger ecosystem of governance.
Presidentialism is based on a reading of the Constitution that is plausible but
hardly undeniable, especially without further justification. The normative justifying
theory for intense and unified presidential control over administration is the
President's electoral legitimacy. As it turns out, the presidency is not, as most
believe, the only electoral office in the Executive Branch. The USDA's farmer
committees are another example; they are elected bureaucrats. But they do not
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The committees wither because they are not tied
to the President as the Presidentialist doctrine demands, even though they are directly
responsive to voters, as Presidentialist rhetoric and normative arguments tress. This
is ironic, and it demonstrates a flaw in Presidentialism: democratic legitimacy is not
truly the touchstone of the doctrine. The touchstone could be the President's
particular electoral connection. But the counter-majoritarian purpose of the Electoral
College, the practicalities of modern politics, and the limited usefulness of a local-
to-national spectrum of scrutiny all demonstrate that the President's electoral
legitimacy is not so special as Presidentialists, including those on the Supreme Court,
contend.
If the failed majoritarian justification does not support elected bureaucrats or
pure Presidentialism, then where is the legitimacy in administrative law?
V. THE MODEL OF "JUST RIGHT" DEMOCRACY
Legitimacy in administrative law comes from democracy, but not a one-
dimensional take, not a forcing of a round democracy into a square hole of
majoritarian vote counting. Instead, legitimacy comes from the robust democracy of
participation that makes room for individualism, reason-giving, deliberation, and
majoritarianism. So much is written about the meaning of democracy-of particular
relevance to this discussion is an objective Weberian view that narrows democracy
into strict instrumentalism versus a Deweyan view that magnifies democracy into
every social interaction.296 This section does not try to add substantially to the canon.
The thinking here is not a perfect definition or idealization, it merely rejects any
single, essential, exalted justification for administration and argues that when
administration reflects the varied constitutional structures that surround coercion,
then it is legitimate. I chose the word "coercion" here as opposed to, say,
"decisionmaking" to draw on Lowi's claim that so much administration seeks to hide
296 E.g., GILBERT, supra note 107, at 4.
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the coercive nature of government by claiming it is not coercive if it is the result of
pluralist negotiations.29' I add to this that unmitigated focus on majoritarian
legitimacy hides the coercive nature of government by focusing on "the people"
rather than the process for decisionmaking and the specific coercive results. I do not
argue that coercion is wrong, only that it should be justified and transparent.
Majoritarianism alone fails in that respect. This might be seen as a pragmatic
repudiation of fundamentalist tropes about democracy.298 But it need not be so
brazen. It is a caution that we should seriously and humbly think and talk about
democracy, rather than assume it embodies a single obvious meaning. Democracy
demands discourse, not certainty.299
The first part of this section justifies the claim that the Constitution provides
for a robust, manifold, democracy beyond majoritarianism. The second part of this
section argues that the dominant structure of administrative governance reflects that
robust constitutional democracy. In other words, administration-so long the subject
of handwringing about legitimacy-is today a form of governance of the same kind
as our larger constitutional system, and therefore administration does not beg for
special attention. The final part offers a comparison of how three models of
administrative law create different opportunities for a participatory constitutional
democracy.
A. Majoritarianism, Deliberation, Reasoning, and Participation
in the Constitution
The Constitution presents a multi-faceted democracy that emerges from
individual participation, reason, deliberation, and majoritarian accountability. This
is the constitutional model of "just right" democracy. It might also be described as a
republican-liberal-populist-rationalist democracy.3' Republican because it spreads
out authority and allows contestation. Liberal because it s limited at least insofar as
it respects certain basic rights and liberties. Populist because it applies
majoritarianism. Rationalist because it demands reasons and reasoning towards ome
297 LOWI, supra note 133, at 62 (writing that "interest group" liberalism, negotiations, participation,
partnership, self-governance, and other "halo words" mask the coercive force of government).
298 See, e.g., Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 609
(2016).
299 Id. at 608-09.
3" HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY
56, 83 (2002).
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conception of truth.01 The view presented in this section also has a significant
overlap with Blake Emerson's very recent reconstruction of Progressive thought as
a driver of a deliberative administrative law. That is, rather than instrumental
formalism, technocracy, or Presidentialism, administrative law is a forum for
creating and reflecting shared public values.302
Today there is a "complacen[cy] about the dominance of majoritarianism as a
constitutional value .... "303 But only in recent times have we begun to idolize
majoritarianism over competing theories of good governance.304 Rather than tracing
unadulterated majoritarianism to the founding or the Constitution, Professor
Bressman attributes its dominance to Bickel and his legendary critique of the
Supreme Court's "counter-majoritarian difficulty." 305 The critique took on a life of
constitutional theory beyond the courts.306 Of course, Bickel was right that the
Supreme Court is, and all Article III courts are, at least, non-majoritarian. This reality
may have normative weight, but there is no purely legal critique of unelected federal
judges since the non-majoritarianism of Article III courts is by constitutional
design.307 This constitutional feature is one of a series of such features that should
point us towards "a more balanced approach" than majoritarian accountability.30 For
instance, while the Constitution does demand accountability (that is, some
majoritarian mechanisms), it also demands reason (that is, non-arbitrary
decisionmaking).309 "The concern for arbitrariness can be seen as one of the primary
evils at which our traditional checks and balances are aimed."310
301 Id.
302 EMERSON, supra note 195.
303 Bressman, supra note 11, at 466.
304 Id. at 466, 478.
305 Id. at 478.
306 See id. ("Although the notion of majoritarianism had been lurking in constitutional theory, it
crystallized into a paradigm when Alexander Bickel (in)famously characterized judicial review of
legislative decisionmaking as 'countermajoritarian.').
307 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
308 Bressman, supra note 11, at 462, 515; see also EISGRUBER, supra note 198, at 65.
309 Bressman, supra note 11, at 462-63.
310 Id. at 468.
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Arbitrariness, the inverse of reason-giving, is thus one concern of the
constitutional structure that works in concert with, rather than at the mercy of,
majoritarianism. There is ample evidence-in constitutional text, structure, and
writings-that the founders did not prefer unchecked majoritarianism.311 This
preference is manifest throughout constitutional law. Whenever government action,
including administrative action, treads on constitutional guarantees, constitutional
law demands not hat the action is tied to majoritarian preference, but that the
government give exceedingly reasoned justifications for the action and demonstrate
that the action is the least restrictive means available.3 1 2 The Fourth Amendment
specifically prohibits "unreasonable" that is, arbitrary, searches and seizures; the Due
Process Clause demands both that any government action "bear some reasonable
relationship to the pursuit of a public purpose" and in more limited circumstances
that the government has employed safeguards to maximize careful
decisionmaking.313 Mashaw writes, "[w]hile we prize elections, we seldom believe
that politicians have received a mandate for relentless and unchecked pursuit of their
vision of the good."3 14 Hence "reasoned administration may provide the most
democratic form of governance available to us in a modern, complex, and deeply
compromised political world."3 1s
The Fifth Amendment provides another example. That Amendment creates an
unambiguous deliberative process in the form of the grand jury requirement.316 (And,
of course, the Sixth Amendment provides even more examples in the criminal justice
context.)317 But the Fifth Amendment also nudges at deliberation and reason-giving
in the Takings and Compensation Clauses.3 18 The Takings Clause only permits the
confiscation of private property when the government will put that property to public
311 MASHAW, supra note 12, at 144.
312 Id. at 44.
3 Id. at 43-44.
31
" Id. at 11.
3 Id. See also Daniel B. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law
Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 131 (2013) (arguing the individuals within administrative
agencies can vindicate arbitrariness or unreasonable action even when those actions are supported by
majoritarian political preferences).
316 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 1.
317 Id. amend. VI.
318 Id. amend. V, cl. 3.
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use.319 The public-use requirement is, at its base, a demand for reason. The
Compensation Clause compels "just compensation" for any private property that the
government does appropriate for public use.320 Practically, calculating compensation
requires deliberation over both the financial consequences of the government's
action and the impact of that action on the private property owner.3 21
Beyond the specific provisions, we must not overlook the larger structures.
Bicameralism and presentment are both tied to the political branches, but the
existence of such vital procedural barriers to political action undoubtedly serves to
limit majoritarian whims in favor of deliberation.322 In the words of the Supreme
Court, "There is an unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by
the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process."3 23 And
of course, most dramatically, the Article III courts are insulated from electoral
politics in order to promote constitutional democracy by, among other things,
assuring that Congress, with its majoritarian pressures, does not offend constitutional
restrictions.324
The broad and specific demands for reason and deliberation accord with Mark
Seidenfeld's argument hat the Constitution is "an attempt to ensure that government
decisions are a product of deliberation that respects and reflects the values of all
members of society."325 Deliberation differs from reason-giving because it does not
presume an objective goal against which we can measure our progress by
transparency and consideration.326 Instead, deliberation marks process as valuable in
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Does the Compensation Clause Burden the Government or Benefit the Owner:
The Compensation Clause as Process, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 27, 36-37 (2011) (When I look back
at this article, my first after law school, I find a lot about which I am embarrassed. But I am still satisfied
withthe general argument that the Compensation Clause is a procedural rather than substantive safeguard.
No need to read further into this article than Section II!).
322 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); Sarah E. Light,
Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647, 1654 (2018).
323 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
324 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-79 (1803); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring); EISGRUBER, supra note 198, at 65.
325 Seidenfeld, supra note 131, at 1514; AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DELIBERATION AND
DISAGREEMENT 12 (1996).
326 Seidenfeld, supra note 131, at 1528.
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and of itself if the process is inclusive and respectful.327 These values are evident in
the Constitution. Deliberation, kneading popular preference into articulate will, was
"the rationale given by the Federalists for the separation of powers, a bicameral
legislature, indirect election of the President and Senate, and the dual system of state
and federal government."328 Likewise, "[t]he counter-majoritarian nature of courts
provides some constraints."329 Deliberation, therefore, is a process for shaping
political will and ideally making that will collaborative, if not consensual. Reason-
giving is then a demand for some articulate connection between deliberate will and
coercive action. Deliberation and reason-giving are distinct but reinforcing.
The Constitution likewise demands an avenue for non-majoritarian, non-
electoral, individual participation in order to instigate and contribute to both
deliberation and reasoning. Professor Maggie Blackhawk recently published a study
of the petitioning process in the early republic.3 30 Blackhawk's contribution adds an
explicit and specific constitutional authorization for an unelected administrative
state, pointing to the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. From careful archival
research, she traces the incremental growth of the administrative state out of that
Clause.3 3 1 The petition process has a number of forms, including private bills,
lobbying, and the Administrative Procedure Act's invitation for private petitions.33 2
Regardless of the form, what petitioning allowed, and allows, is an "avenue for
political participation distinct from the vote. The process was available to even the
unfranchised and did not operate by a majoritarian decision rule." 333 This is much
like the legal process in Article III courts, also open to all and separated from the
political process, but unlike the courts of law, the petition process was not limited to
those with an identifiable cause of action, standing, or other threshold qualifications
for judicial review.334
Although the Petition Clause is a new basis of direct constitutional support for
a bureaucracy, it fits with earlier arguments that partial majoritarian insulation is not
32. Id. at 1514.
328 Id. at 1533.
329 Id. at 1574.
331 McKinley, supra note 195, at 1546-47.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 1555.
3 Id. at 1559.
3 Id.
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a weakness of the bureaucracy, but a strength. Partial majoritarian insulation is
ubiquitous within our constitutional democracy. The Petition Clause "offered the
politically powerless a means of participating that was formal, public, and not driven
by political power."335
We learn at least two things from this analysis of how the Constitution may
address democratic and participatory ideals. First, the Constitution establishes a
diverse democracy for the United States, not merely a system of vote-counting and
majoritarian rule. This complex democracy balances majoritarian impulse and
accountability with processes for deliberation, safeguards against arbitrariness, and
opportunities for individual disaggregated participation. Where others rightly focus
on separation of power, the way different players carry specific authority, whether
through constitutional or sub-constitutional division,336 the view I present here adds
meaningful democracy as a constraint, alongside separation of powers. Second, this
"just right" democracy can explain the modern structure of the administrative state.
We need not accept that "just right" democracy is the theoretically ideal democracy,
only that it is the democracy embodied in the Constitution.
B. Majoritarianism, Deliberation, Reasoning, and Participation
in Administration
The general structure of the administrative state is legitimate because it is a
structure that mimics constitutional design. The Constitution demands majoritarian
motivation and oversight; the administrative state is built by Congress and riven by
the President. The Constitution demands deliberation; the administrative state, in its
regulatory and adjudicatory functions, is rife with mandatory dialogue. The
Constitution demands reason-giving, and few administrative actions can survive
without articulate explanations. The Constitution demands deliberation to facilitate
reasoning and participation. The administrative state welcomes engagement in
substantively meaningful ways. Electoral administration, like Presidentialism,
necessarily subverts all of this to some vision of majoritarian will.
This is not to say that the administrative state is perfect, just that it tracks with
constitutional principles of legitimacy. There is room for improvement in
administrative governance, particularly when the conversation moves beyond
baseline legitimacy to broader efforts at advancing administration as a tool of lively,
m Id. at 1547.
336 Michaels, supra note 267, at 533-34.
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inclusive, and sustainable democracy.337 But even the flawed administrative
framework of today offers plenty to praise.
The majoritarian direction and oversight of the administrative state come from
two obvious constitutional mandates. Both Congress and the President are
"constitutionally appointed monitors" of administrative agencies.3 38 Congress makes
laws;339 the President makes appointments.340 The mission of federal agencies is to
carry out the direction that Congress gives them through the law. Despite wide
discretion on tools, strategies, and even specific goals, agencies may not, sua sponte,
invent new powers.3 41 Congress can structure the nuanced details of agency behavior,
including specific scientific formulations3 42 and regulatory timelines,34 3 and
Congress can even create novel mechanisms to enforce its demands.3 4 4 Once
Congress empowers an agency, the President oversees its operations. The President
appoints agency leadership.3 45 And the President or the President's appointees can
remove high-level administrators at-will or according to congressional guidelines.3 46
In practice, presidential control goes even further. Presidents exert daily, direct
influence over agencies through the agency budget-request process and through
regulatory review from the Office of Management and Budget, which requires
careful cost-benefit analysis for major rules.34 7 At the time of this writing, President
7 See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 195; RICHARDSON, supra note 300.
338 MASHAW, supra note 12, at 86.
339 U.S. CONST. art. I.
340 Id. art. I, § 1.
34 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018) (granting courts the authority to overturn agency action that is
not compliant with statutory commands).
342 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (2018) (describing requirements for "maximum sustainable yield" and
"optimum yield" standards in fisheries management).
43 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(2) (2018) (establishing a six-month timeline for action on Clean Air Act
visibility standards).
3" E.g., id. § 7604 (authorizing citizen suits to enforce the Clean Air Act).
45 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 51 (5th ed. 2009). See, e.g., Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
346 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
3 MASHAW, supra note 12, at 92-93.
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Trump is working to expand this measure of presidential, and therefore majoritarian,
oversight over administrators.3 48
The notice-and-comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act is the
clearest example of structured administrative deliberation. The notice-and-comment
process requires that agencies give public notice of their proposed actions, receive
public comment on those actions, engage with public input, and incorporate input
into their final decision.3 49 This is all part of the run-up to administrative reason-
giving, but it has a stand-alone deliberative quality. In United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Products Corp., for instance, the Second Circuit held that the Food and Drug
Administration's failure to disclose the scientific studies on which their rulemaking
relied was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.350 The problem was not
that the agency made a bad substantive decision, misread the science, or failed to
explain itself, but that by not disclosing the studies on which it relied, the agency had
not given the interested public a reasonable opportunity to engage in the policy
deliberation.351 "We can think of no sound reasons," the court wrote, "for secrecy or
reluctance to expose to public view . .. the ingredients of the deliberative
process."35 2
Closely related to deliberation is reason-giving, or its inverse, arbitrariness.
Concern for reasonableness, of course, is explicit in the Administrative Procedure
Act, which directs courts to overturn agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 3s3 Professor
Mashaw identifies Judge Wilkie's opinion in National Tire Dealers.4 as the epitome
of this distinctive demand for reason-giving in the administrative state.355 The D.C.
Circuit there threw out several National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
348 Memorandum from Acting Dir. Russell T. Vought, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies on
Guidance on Compliance with the Cong. Review Act (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf.
349 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
351 United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
351 Id.
352 Id.
3 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
35 Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'nv. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
35 MASHAW, supra note 12, at 3.
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standards because the agency did not offer sufficient reasons for the standards.3 6 In
addition to its new standards, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
also reiterated standards that Congress had itself developed in the underlying
statute.357 The court found that, even though Congress had given no reasons for its
rules, "[it] must faithfully carry out the express mandate of Congress. No
administrative procedure test applies to an act of Congress."358 But applied to
agencies, the test clearly demands reason.359
This same sentiment that agencies must give particularly systematic reasons is
embodied in the "hard look" doctrine of judicial review, which the Supreme Court
approved in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm.360 The Court
held that "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made."3 61
In the June 2019 "census case," the Court added to this aspect of reason-giving,
demanding that the agency not only give reasons but give honest reasons. According
to Chief Justice Roberts, for the majority, "the reasoned explanation requirement of
administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine
justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and
the interested public."362 Even more recently, in June 2020, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court, again reiterated the importance of careful and genuine reason-
giving. In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, the "DACA case," the Court reinforced the longstanding rule that
agencies must give contemporaneous reason for their actions, not "post hoc
rationalizations."3 63 Likewise, the Court explained that this procedural rule in
356 Id. (citing Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n, 491 F.2d at 37).
3 Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n, 491 F.2d at 37.
358 Id.
359 This administrative law demand for rationality provides the space for what Professor Walters calls
"litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy." Walters, supra note 315, at 130. Where lower-level
administrators see lack of reasoning they can "reveal evidence of dissonance in the agency's
decisionmaking process" thereby teeing up issues for litigation. Id. at 131.
361 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
361 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
362 Dep't of Comm. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575-76 (2019) (emphasis added).
363 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1908 (2020) (citing
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
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administrative law is not an "idle and useless formality." 364 Instead, procedural rules
like the demand for contemporaneous reason-giving serve important values such as
public engagement and deliberation.365 Reason-giving is the groundwork for
democratic debate, without honest reasons, just as there is no basis for judicial
review, there is no structure for democratic debate.
The final embodiment of robust constitutional democracy in the administrative
state is the non-majoritarian, non-electoral, channel of individual participation. In an
electoral framework, participation is aggregate only, and there are thresholds for who
may become part of that aggregation, for example, minimum voting age366 or
citizenship.367 Participation in administrative decisionmaking comes with no such
thresholds, and it can be direct rather than aggregate. Direct participation comes in
at least three prominent forms. There is the constitutional right to petition the
government that creates low-cost and individual access to government.368 There is
the notice-and-comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
welcomes all public input in the form of "written data, views, or arguments."3 69 The
Act also creates a statutory petition process by which "interested persons [have] the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."370 Finally, there is
a broad scope of judicial review of agency action that provides for individual
substantive input. Many substantive statutes provide causes of action under which
an aggrieved person can petition for review of, for example, an agency
rulemaking.371 Where no such cause of action exists in the substantive statutes, the
Administrative Procedure Act creates a fallback channel to the courts.372 In each of
these examples, the individual participation is, again, not limited by age, citizenship,
or expertise. And yet, in each example, participation can have significant and direct
36" Id. at 16.
365 Id.
366 U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, § 1.
367 Id. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV.
368 McKinley, supra note 195, at 1547.
369 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
37 See id. § 553(e).
7 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (2018) (creating a framework for appellate review of Environmental
Protection Agency rules under the Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2018) (creating a framework
for appellate review of Securities and Exchange Commission actions).
372 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
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consequences. Administrative petitions can force regulatory action.373 Commenters
can change administrative direction.374 And even when comments do not do the trick,
litigation can have a powerful impact.37 The power of participation in the
administrative process is evident in, for instance, the environmental movement
where there are far more advocacy groups focused on litigation and administrative
engagement than voter mobilization. 376
The Constitution assembles majoritarian and non-majoritarian structures to
produce a robust democracy that includes political will, reason, deliberation, and
non-majoritarian engagement. Taking these features together, it seems that one key
feature of constitutional democracy is participation. Participation comes in the form
of voting, but also in legal, technical, and equitable contributions. Individuals vote
for representatives, senators, and (indirectly) the President. Individuals can litigate
to demand government action or inaction comply with constitutional or statutory
mandates. Individuals are invited to engage in administration through the notice-and-
comment process that does not count votes but instead counts substantive, often
technical, input. These features assure that people have the opportunity to "be
present, not merely represented."37 All of this led to Professor Blackhawk's
conclusion that we are looking not at the "administrative state," but at the
"participatory state."378 The electoral and Presidentialist models both reflect the
importance of participation, but they shunt much of it to votes.
C. Comparing Models
Participation has always been part of administration.379 As early as 1902,
Congress directed USDA to consult with experts in a specific rulemaking process.380
'3 Massachusetts v. EPA., 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
"7 E.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasoning that agencies
must have the flexibility to change rules in response to public comments).
"5 E.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
376 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Board Rooms and Jail Cells: Assessing NGO Approaches to Private
Environmental Governance, 71 ARK. L. REV. 403 (2018).
37 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
OBJECTIVITY 242 (2008).
378 E.g., McKinley, supra note 195.
379 Id.
380 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 105
(1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act famously established participation as a
central component of rulemaking.381 If participation was populist in the early
republic, it was distinctly corporatist at mid-century, aimed at giving regulated
industry access to their would-be regulators,382 or even turning over regulatory
authority directly to industry.383 When the rulemaking revolution arrived later in the
century, there was renewed interest in making participation genuinely public and
avoiding regulatory "capture" of agencies.384 In vogue from the 1980s through today,
the Presidentialist model champions flattened participation only in the form of voting
for the President.38 5
At present, we are left with two dominant participatory models in
administration: the interest representation model (which I suggest we call the
"information representation model" or even the "constitutional administration"
model), which lives on from the statutes and administrative law doctrine of the late
20th Century and is the general form of administrative law described in the previous
parts;386 and the Presidentialist model, which is rapidly gaining sway and dismantling
the status quo.387 Electoral administration is hardly a dominant model, but
uncovering it provides a helpful comparison. The comparison of interest
representation, Presidentialism, and electoral administration brings into relief the
distinct qualities of each form of participation by showing that participation has more
variables than we typically consider. This comparison is detailed further in Table 1.
381 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
382 FINAL REPORT, supra note 380, at 105.
383 Whitman, supra note 132, at 749-50.
384 Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE. L.J. 359, 381 (1972).
385 Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59.
386 Stewart, supra note 14, at 1670.
387 Calabresi, supra note 9, at 59.
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Table 1: Comparing the Different Qualities of Participation Between
Different Models ofAdministration
Electoral .e . Info.
Admin. Representation
Scope: Breadth of Narrow. Only Broad. The entire Broad.
public invited to farmers electorate is Participation
participate. participating in eligible to vote in welcome beyond
federal programs presidential electorate,
may vote and elections. including those





Content/Depth: Deep. Voting and Shallow. Voting Deep. Substantive
Nature of invited direct only. technical/factual
participation. administration. and legal input.
Barriers: High. Low. Must be Low. Input must
Procedural Participation eligible to vote in be substantively
hurdles to limited to select the presidential valuable or
participation. farmers based on election. legally effective
government to be impactful




Proximity: Space Direct. Direct Indirect. Wide Direct. All
between election of gap between participants can
participatory administrators voting and comment directly
action & and the administration on rulemaking. If
administrative opportunity to includes properly situated,
action. serve. presidential engage in
election, a adjudication and
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Electoral .e . Info.
Presidentialism
Admin. Representation
Impact High. Few Low. Only High. Although
Potential: candidates and aggregate votes the majority is
Possibility that voters, paired influence non-substantive,
participation will with local scope, administrative substantive
influence allows the direction. comments can





Costs to High. Low cost Low. Low to no High. Expenses
Participants: for voting, but a costs for voting. associated with
Expense higher cost for research,
associated with gathering expertise, and
meaningful candidate info especially judicial
engagement. than normal engagement are
elections. The extremely high.
cost of time and
energy for
serving is high.
Costs to High. High cost Low. No added High. High cost
Government: of maintaining cost over regular of adjudications
Expense of thousands of elections. and RM and
operating the committees with especially judicial
participatory staff and running review.
system. thousands of
elections.
Transparency: Medium. Purpose Low. Presidential High. Though
Clarity to not clear because voting bundles some commenters
participants on elections imply together more misunderstand
the role & effect political issues than a substantive (not
of their discretion, but single voter can vote counting)
participation. only statutory realistically parse nature of
discretion exists. and prioritize. comments, other
(cont'd)
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Deliberation: High. Local and Low. Votes only, High. APA and
Space for explicit esoteric nature the administration judicial review
policy plus a limited is packaged with structure mandate
consideration and number of broader political procedures aimed
dialogue. participants issues, no at deliberation.
allows for robust designed
deliberation. deliberation.
The interest representation model relies on a robust but costly form of
engagement built on interaction, technical comments, and the possibility of
litigation. Though barriers to entry, such as submitting comments, are low, the
barriers to meaningful participation, that is, changing policy, are high. But once
crossed, the effort can be wildly fruitful. With substantial technical expertise, a
participant can have a meaningful impact on administration. This model is uniquely
public because the opportunity is open to anybody, even more than the opportunity
to vote, although the cost for effective participation is higher. But given that the
currency of this participation is substance and expertise, it might better be called the
"information representation model."388 Alternatively, it could equally be called the
constitutional administration model because it so encompasses the participatory,
reason-giving, deliberative, and electoral pillars of the Constitution.
388 This term reflects both a pro and a con of the modern administrative state. Information representation
creates important and comparatively powerful and democratic opportunities. But these opportunities are
rooted, ultimately, in information, not moral and ethical claims or collective decisionmaking without a
priori demands about the variables that may hold sway within that decisionmaking. Although this has
much to recommend it, it falls short of the higher aspirations to which-although outside the scope of this
Article-some scholars (probably myself included) hold the administrative state. See, e.g., EMERSON,
supra note 195; see also K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017).
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The Presidentialist model relies on slender but broadly accessible participation,
voting in presidential elections. Voting does not provide the means of direct
interaction as in the information/interest representation model, and as it is based on
vote aggregation, it does not present opportunities for an individual to have direct
influence over administration. However, the cost of participation is negligible, and
regardless of expertise or resources, each person has the same formal role in electing
the President to control the administration.
The electoral model, at least as it is visible in the farmer committees, offers
something different still. Participation is open to a limited group, farmers only. On
the one hand, the formal nature of participation is voting, just as in Presidentialism,
though the voting is limited to a smaller band of policy issues. On the other hand,
there is an opportunity to become an administrator, not just to influence an
administrator. However one slices this, the impact of participation is higher than
Presidentialism because even in voting, the cabined issue-scope will provide for
clearer policy signals. As compared to the information representation model, being
an administrator is likely more impactful than informing an administrator, but voting
for an administrator does not compare as clearly. Of course, participation as an
administrator also comes with a very high investment of time.
Recognizing that different models provide different qualities of participation,
if participation is indeed an important aspect of administrative legitimacy, one must
ask how either electoral administration or Presidentialism can compete with the
constitutional information representation model. The information representation
model welcomes political input-that is, input without reason-giving-through
various mechanisms of presidential control, from appointment (and often removal)
of administrators to presidential directives and through initial congressional
delegation and appropriations. The information representation model further
welcomes substantive technical input, rationality, and demands deliberation through,
for example, the notice-and-comment process. The electoral and Presidentialist
models do not necessarily refuse rationality and deliberation, but both claim to trump
reason-giving and deliberation with political will. At the very least, electoral
administration may not claim to trump other modes of participation, but if elected
administrators are not free to exercise their political will, one wonders whether the
election has any meaning.
Of course, the ancient knowledge that has renewed political salience today is
that unbridled majoritarianism, electoral or Presidentialist, can lead to hateful
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populism, which tramples the individual rights of those not part of the majority. 389
Over generations that majoritarianism can create such structural injustices-as it has
against Black people in America, in farm country and everywhere else-that the
injustice becomes durable even in a more enlightened political process.390
Majoritarianism can also let those in the victorious majority punish political rivals
without reason or deliberation.391 When judicial supervision worries largely about
election victories, there is too little recourse.
The Constitution generates existential legitimacy for the coercive authority of
government by cobbling together multiple qualities of participation. The
administrative state should not be faulted for doing exactly the same thing. It is
imperfect and should live up to higher aspirations that may require significant
reforms, but it demonstrates value and offers promise, perhaps more than any other
features of the federal government. The goal of administrative law should be to build
up a multi-faceted, complex, participatory structure rather than one that promises to
tidy up democracy with easy answers and facile promises of shallow plebiscites.
VI. CONCLUSION: AGAINST EASY ANSWERS
Administrative governance has claims to legitimacy that go well beyond
majoritarianism. And it is a good thing that the majoritarian claim does not stand
alone because the impending death of electoral administration betrays the hollowness
of mere vote counting. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Lena Riemer recently wrote that
"mechanical efforts to justify controversial policies by reference to the chain of
legitimacy are inadequate."392 Essentialist claims of legitimacy may be easy and
389 E.g., Sarah Rapucci, The Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, 31 J. DEMOCRACY 137, 137 (2020),
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/753200/pdf.
390 See, e.g., Curtis Milam, How I Learned to Relax and Love Donald Trump, THE PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 23, 2020, https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/donald-trump-revolution-uprising-
election-2020-20200623.html ("We fought a civil war to end slavery but failed in its aftermath to establish
the more perfect union mentioned by our Founders. What we are seeing in our current moment is not only
a race war but a class war. America must confront systemic racism to move forward, but it also must
acknowledge that we have created a permanent underclass of all colors (though mostly black and
brown).")
391 E.g., Christine Wilkie, Trump says coronavirus 'bailouts' for blue states are unfair to Republicans,
CNBC.COM (May 5, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/05/coronavirus-trump-says-blue-state-
bailouts-unfair-to-republicans.html.
392 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Lena Riemer, Strengthening Democracy Through Public Participation in
Policymaking: The EU, Germany, and the United States, YALE J. ON REG. (May 6, 2019), http://yalejreg
.com/nc/strengthening-democracy-through-public-participation-in-policymaking-the-eu-germany-and-
the-united-states-by-susan-rose-ackerman-lena-riemer/.
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appealing, but they are, as Rose-Ackerman and Riemer say, inadequate because they
do not force meaningful consideration. Easy answers of this nature, in the words of
Doug Kysar, "prove[] disruptive to the project of reasoning through certain daunting
collective issues."393 By demonstrating the problem of electoral administration and
remarking on what the weakness of electoral administration says about other
majoritarian strategies in the administrative state, the goal of this Article is to use the
unlikely case study of elected bureaucrats to support the more complex view of
democracy. Participatory, deliberative, rational, and electoral strands of democracy
all work together to maintain a constitutionally sound government.
But there can be no doubt that welcoming multiple, sometimes competing,
justifications depart from the parsimony of simple majoritarianism. Perhaps,
however, a simple and efficient account is actually a disservice to democracy for
those very reasons. Perhaps when we offer easy answers, we lull democracy into a
sense of inevitability. We prefer that the easy answer is the right answer, and any
debate becomes a zero-sum endeavor. Inevitability breeds laziness in lieu of
consideration, and zero-sum conditions breed antagonism in lieu of collaboration.
To paraphrase Alf Ross, to invoke voting, and voting alone, is equivalent to banging
on the table.394 Without more, it is an emotional appeal and a claim to victory without
debate. Or, to instead paraphrase Jerome Frank, relying on a formal but simplistic
rule of majoritarianism is akin to the father gently promising his children security,
and we the children accept that authority because we crave the easy assurance.39
It is finally time for an extended sports comparison. An effective taunt in
competitive sports is for a player who is ahead in the game to point at the scoreboard
to show that what really matters, the score, is on her side.396 The braggadocio aims
to put an end to another conflict in the game, perhaps a questionable call by the
referee. In sports judged by final scores, the scoreboard point is a powerful argument.
As long as all that matters is the final score. In a constitutional democracy, the final
score is definitively not all that matters. The majority preference, the winner of an
election, has significant authority based on that victory. But the essential role of a
393 KYSAR, supra note 377, at 15.
394 See ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 364 (Jackob v. H. Holtermann ed., Uta Bindreiter trans., Oxford
2019) (1953).
395 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
396 E.g., Harry Lyles, Jr., Kyrie Irving Taunted Isaiah Thomas by Pointing to the Scoreboard in Game 1,
SBNATION (May 17, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/2017/5/17/15656646/kyrie-irving-isaiah-thomas-
trash-talk-point-scoreboard-cavs-celtics; Adam Gretz, Vinny Prospal Gets 10-Minute Misconduct for
ScoreboardPoint, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.cbssports.com/nhl/news/vinny-prospal-gets-
10-minute-misconduct-for-scoreboard-point/.
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written constitution is to explain what is necessary beyond winning votes. Pointing
to the electoral scoreboard simply is not enough.
Electoral administration emerged in the New Deal agriculture programs
because Congress and the administration were searching for ways to avoid
confronting the most difficult challenges in agriculture policy. Rather than facing
racist and classist social structures, failing economic models, and ideological dissent,
electoral administration was, at least in part, a strategy to cover up these challenges
by turning them over to "the people." What could be simpler, more honorable, and
less ideologically controversial? This ploy worked insofar as Congress and the
Roosevelt administration advanced their policy. If there was a concern, they could
point to the scoreboard. But they avoided solving many larger problems, and today
we continue to wrestle with racism in farm governance,397 floundering farm
economies,398 and ideological objection to farm programs.399 I can hardly suggest
that a different policy approach would have solved any of these problems, but an
approach that admitted the problems were intricate and required a purposeful attitude
grounded more in problem-solving than problem-avoidance might have spurred a
public conversation about substantive solutions.4 0 0
More general in scope, Presidentialism suffers from the same flaw of hiding
complexity in soothing promises or competitive taunts. Where farm controversy was
simplified to "let the farmer decide," Presidentialism goes further. Whether it is food
and agriculture, environmental protection, immigration, or corporate accounting,
whatever the complexity, Presidentialism resolves that complexity into a melodious
tonic: "The President, the people, accountability." That is too simple. It smothers
debate.40 1 As a process for resolving conflicts, the law should welcome debate where
it is warranted. The participatory constitutional system of individuality, deliberation,
397 Nathan Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, How USDA Distorted Data to Conceal Decades of
Discrimination Against Black Farmers, COUNTER (June 26, 2019), https://newfoodeconomy.org/usda-
black-farmers-discrimination-tom-vilsack-reparations-civil-rights/.
398 Mary Kay Thatcher, Farm States Slammed by Double Whammy of US-China Trade War and
Immigration Woes, CNBC (July 10, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/farm-states-slammed-by-
us-china-trade-war-and-immigration-woes.html.
399 Molly Ball, How Republicans Lost the Farm, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2014/01/how-republicans-lost-the-farm/283349/.
400 Joshua Galperin, Graham Downey & D. Lee Miller, Eating Is not PoliticalAction, 13 J. FOOD L. &
POL'Y 113, 118, 124 (2017).
401 See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 195, at 183 ("Politics in such a situation becomes a winner-take-all
phenomenon It becomes a clash of ideologies represented by heroic figures, rather than a considered and
constructive debate between representatives in whom we invest provisional confidence.").
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reasoning, and voting is a system that embraces debate and a template for
administrative governance.
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